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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Northeast Brazil, many say, has the best gene pool in the world, for only a superhuman 
can survive droughts, floods, politicians, infant mortality, and foreign researchers. 
Colonialism, and slavery never ended here; they just earned more flattering names. 
(Arons 2004, 60). 
 
This study aims at anthropologically understanding and analyzing one of the most 
challenging plagues of mankind: poverty. It is also an attempt to defend the importance 
of applied anthropology, towards which, some argue, there seems to be a certain 
disdain, especially concerning the field of development and poverty issues.  
‘Development anthropologists’ have been accused of reinforcing ethnocentric and 
dominating models of development, and of reiterating, in the name of cultural 
sensitivity, conventional views of modernization, social change, and the Third World, 
placing anthropology at the service of power. (Escobar 1991; Stonich ref. Brosius 1999, 
298).  Being, however, particularly interested in these themes myself, I follow in the 
footsteps of Stonich and other critics in challenging this disdain – if focusing on poverty 
and wanting to use anthropological knowledge to come up with ways of alleviating it 
will inevitably lead into ‘bad science’, what hope lies there for those of us who want to 
focus on these very issues?  
Poverty takes many forms, and has a wide array of conceptualizations. The form of 
poverty that I focus on in this work is closely tied with the theoretical concept of 
structural violence, that is, poverty not as material lack but as needs-deprivation and 
constraints to filling potentials. I have also decided to observe the links between 
structural violence and ecological hazards, focusing on the discourse on climate change. 
As Ulrich Beck states, “Ecology is guilty of forgetting about society, just as social 
science and social theory are predicated on the forgetting of ecology. The terrain has 
been staked out by the concepts both of system and of environment. The proponents of 
each disdain the other, without noticing that it is public awareness that preselects 
ecological questions via a historical aggregate of society and nature, in which so-called 
‘ecological hazards’ are always systemic hazards.” (Beck 1995, 40). 
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In recent decades the trend of linking environmental concerns to studies of poverty has 
become more and more pronounced in various fields. Development projects nowadays 
have a number of cross-cutting themes, such as gender issues, human rights issues, and 
environmental issues incorporated into their agendas. This tendency also shows in 
anthropological studies, in which there has been a notable shift from the cultural 
ecology of the 1950s and 1960s to the environmental anthropology of the present. 
Among the most prominent works of the earlier cultural ecology are those of Julian 
Steward, who focused on ‘multilinear evolution’, that is multiple pathways of 
adaptation to a certain environment over time. (Sponsel 2007). Another line of research 
originating in the 1950s and 60s was ethnoecology, highlighting the classificatory 
systems and vocabulary used by different cultures to view their environment.  
Towards the 1980s, a more materialistic paradigm took hold in the study of ecological 
anthropology, with the works of scholars such as Roy Rappaport and Marvin Harris. 
(Sponsel 2007). Harris used the idea of cultural materialism as a research strategy to 
reveal and explain the ecological rationale underlying various aspects of culture. In his 
view, the cultural system can be divided into three components: 1) infrastructure, 
resulting from the interactions among environment, population, and technology; 2) 
structure, as the outcome of local domestic and wider political economy; and 3) 
superstructure, the ideational realm encompassing religion, myth, and the arts. (Sponsel 
2007). The contemporary environmental anthropology, exemplified in the works of 
Peter Brosius and Susan Stonich, among others, combines a range of sources: 
poststructuralist social and cultural theory, political economy, globalization theory, 
among others. Therefore the present environmental anthropology has established 
stronger links to the study of power and inequality, regimes of knowledge production 
and to the importance of the globalization process. (Brosius 1999, 278).   
At the moment, a rising trend is precisely the study of climate change, the loss of 
biodiversity and its effects on cultural systems, and environmental justice, often linked 
with questions of indigenous communities’ rights. However, there are still relatively 
few studies of what is happening in particular places, and within specific organizations, 
to the relations of power among individuals, communities, and the state. Thus, the 
discourse within which the impact of NGO practices are presented as the solution to 
problems of welfare, development and democratization, especially tied to environmental 
affairs, is a terrain yet to be discovered further by scholars. (Fisher 1997, 441). 
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What first aroused my interest in the discourse on climate change was the emergence of 
a discussion in the international media about potential future hoards of climate refugees. 
(Eg. Helsingin Sanomat 30.11.2009; BBC News 18.11.2009; CNN News 10.06.2009). 
It seems that once the social side of climate change has been taken up for analysis, the 
first expected impact is large-scale migration, making climate change also a 
“geopolitical hazard”. On the whole, I had paid little attention to discussion about 
climate change until these images and estimates started popping up constantly in the 
media. Thus, I decided to search for answers to a question posed by Beck in the mid-
nineties: “What does the threat of self-annihilation mean to society, its institutions, its 
understanding of progress and of itself; to the legal, scientific and economic system; to 
politics and cultures?” (Beck 1995, 180).  He also brings up an interesting idea 
defending the anthropological necessity of studying risks in contemporary world, 
arguing that the new threats from civilization lead to the emergence of a kind of new 
‘shadow kingdom’, comparable to the realm of the gods and demons in earlier times, 
hidden behind the visible world: “The role of the spirits would be taken over by 
invisible but omnipresent pollutants and toxins.” (Beck 1992, 72-73). 
 
1.1 Research question 
 
This study focuses on three main issues that exemplify the problem of structural 
violence in the hinterlands of Northeast Brazil: land use, the drought industry and the 
social and power relations that lie behind these, including the past and present actions of 
government institutions and the agribusiness sector. Further on attention is drawn to 
forms of resistance by the civil society by means of green consciousness and through 
the search for alternative solutions, such as agro-ecological farming, to environmental 
dilemmas.  I also argue that focusing on power relations and the social structure alone is 
insufficient, as the symbolic realm of values, portrayed through popular culture and 
imagery plays an essential role in defining and maintaining these structures. The topic 
of structural violence in the hinterlands of Northeast Brazil could have been approached 
from a number of different perspectives, such as gender relations, race and ethnic 
questions, or even an intergenerational approach. However, within the scope of this 
study it is impossible to focus on everything, which is why I have decided to leave these 
perspectives to the background. My choice of topics arose as the result of the first 
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encounters with informants, many of whom repeatedly brought up these very themes 
when discussing the question of climate change.  As mentioned earlier, what initially 
sparked my interest in the topic was the media coverage of potential future ‘climate 
refugees’, and my initial hypothesis was that in Northeast Brazil, the general tendency 
would also be that of migration resulting from challenges posed to subsistence farming 
and other land-related livelihoods by a changing environment. As often happens in the 
field, I had to redefine and question my initial hypothesis, as my first observations and 
discussions with informants led not to talk about migrants in search of a better life in the 
cities, but to farming techniques, environmental activism and the question of land rights.  
I chose Northeast Brazil as my fieldwork site for a number of reasons. First, it was often 
portrayed in the media as one of the first areas of the globe to suffer from the impacts of 
climate change. Second, the semiarid region of Northeast Brazil has not only suffered 
from extreme climatic phenomena, such as droughts, throughout history, but has also 
developed a unique culture that has the sertanejos’1 relation to land and nature as a 
central theme. The third reason for choosing Brazil as the fieldwork site for this study is 
that the Brazilian society is by many described as one that has a tradition of inequality 
and structural violence. Particularly the problems of drought, misery and hunger have 
historically been seen as the best example of the survival of a pre-capitalist, feudal 
social structure impeding real development in the region. (Soares, 2008).  
 
1.2 Why droughts? The relevance of studying environmental phenomena from an 
anthropological perspective 
 
I decided to focus on the problem of droughts in the sertão because the notion of 
drought, or a seca as it is traditionally known, has long historical roots and cultural 
understandings related to it in the region. The very identity of a sertanejo, or inhabitant 
of the sertão, is intertwined with the concept of a seca. Historically, the 
underdevelopment, periodic famines and misery of the region have all been contributed 
to droughts. What also got me interested in studying specifically droughts is the 
                                                             
1 The semiarid hinterlands of Northeast Brazil are locally known as the sertão, which I 
will be using to designate the region from now on. An inhabitant of this region is 
referred to as the sertanejo. 
6 
 
recurring affirmation in literature concerning the region that there droughts are 
essentially a social, not a climatological problem. I was curious to see whether the 
discourse on climate change has altered the underlying social structures present in the 
region, age-old understandings related to droughts, and what coping strategies the locals 
have devised for present and future changes in the natural environment around them. 
Through different media, the general discussion on climate change has also reached the 
hinterlands of Northeast Brazil. As an area historically seen as inhospitable and as a 
very vulnerable environment, climate change could further alter the living conditions of 
millions of people and change the landscape drastically in the next 50 to 100 years. As 
mentioned above, I also wanted to see whether the predicted social consequences of 
climate change, mainly that of massive migrations, are in fact a reality or not in the 
hinterlands of Northeast Brazil. 
Yet another reason for choosing to focus on droughts is the parallels I find it to have 
with the phenomenon of structural violence. Arons notes:  
Drought is like a slow-motion war, except no one turns on CNN every fifteen minutes to 
check out the latest turn of events, charts, statistics, or what the talking head has to say. It 
is the forgotten natural disaster, the one no one wants to watch. And as with the unnatural 
disaster that is war, political issues invariably lie behind the madness. (Arons 2004, 22).  
 
Thus, just as structural violence is a forgotten form of violence due to its invisibleness 
and duration, droughts are “the forgotten natural disaster”.  They are different from 
other natural hazards in that they accumulate over time, linger for years and rarely 
create structural damage as a hurricane or earthquake might.  
Droughts are defined not only by their duration, but also by their geographical extent, 
and frequency. The areas most acutely affected by droughts are the semiarid regions of 
the globe, which account for 13 to 16 percent of the earth and are home to 
approximately 10 percent of the world´s population. Recent studies of droughts have 
shown that a number of both social and environmental factors influence the impact of 
climate on society. Poverty, landlessness, inappropriate technologies, the poor quality of 
soils, and political weakness make some population groups more vulnerable to drought 
than others. (Liverman 1990, 49). Of the globe’s arid and semi-arid regions, the most 
economically deprived and the most populated one is the semiarid region of northeast 
Brazil, the sertão. There is considerable variation in the severity and suddenness of 
droughts depending on regional specificities, such as the availability of water sources, 
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water use, the level of water utilization, the quality of water and how institutions deal 
with the shortages. These factors once again highlight the social dimension of droughts.   
 
1.3 Fieldwork and methodology 
 
I would fatigue my hosts with foolish questions and refuse to understand their answers. 
There was the danger that I would repeat things I had heard and seen. I was a constant 
source of social embarrassment. (Barley 1983,56). 
 
The fieldwork for this study was conducted over a period of three months, from August 
2010 to November 2010 in the states of Pernambuco and Paraíba in Northeast Brazil.2 
The fieldwork was divided between two regions: the city of Recife, the capital city of 
the state of Pernambuco located on the coast, and the interior semiarid regions of the 
states of Pernambuco and Paraíba. Recife has a population of slightly over 4 million 
inhabitants, and is the fourth biggest metropolitan area in the country. It is the most 
important commercial and industrial centre in the Northeast, and has historically been 
also a major pole of migration from the interior and surrounding states. During my three 
month stay I lived in Recife, mainly because logistically it was easiest to get around 
from there to different locations, and also because most of the NGOs, government 
agencies and universities were stationed there. I also found early on that many of my 
potential informants, although currently living in Recife, were originally from the 
sertão. 
Methodologically, my fieldwork consisted of interviews, participant observation, and 
attending two seminars, one organized by the NGO Caritas on climate change, and one 
organized by the Federal University of Pernambuco (UFPE) on agro-ecological 
farming, including a two day workshop on an agro-ecological family farm near Recife.  
I conducted a total of 22 interviews, out of which 6 were group interviews and 16 
individual ones. The interviews were semi-structured, 8 of them also involving a free 
listing exercise where the informants had to list the first words they related with the 
concept of ‘climate change’ in the region. All of the interviews were conducted in 
                                                             
2 The states will from now on be referred to by their abbreviations in reference to 
interviews and field notes; PE for Pernambuco and PB for Paraíba respectively. 
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Brazilian Portuguese, and have been freely translated by me into English. In addition to 
the interviews, observation and seminars, I used a number of policy briefs issued by the 
government, material published by the NGOs, and collected cordel -poetry3, excerpts of 
which are used to highlight the popular culture aspect of the issues I study throughout 
this work. I have left the original Brazilian Portuguese versions of these poems beside 
the English translations, as they are also my own free translations.  Most of the data was 
collected in Recife, complemented by shorter trips to the sertão through the NGO 
Caritas to locations in the states of Pernambuco and Paraíba, where they were involved 
in social projects. My informants could be roughly divided into 4 groups: academic 
experts studying environmental and social issues, mainly from the Federal University of 
Pernambuco; trained workers for organizations working on the field or in government 
agencies in Recife; local farmers and beneficiaries of the projects I visited; and mainly 
lower-class workers in Recife, who had mostly migrated from the sertão to the capital, 
and whose families were still living there.  The gender division of the informants was 
44% women, 56% men, their ages ranging from 19 to around 70 years. 
My first contact in Recife after arriving was with the Federal University, where I 
conducted the first expert interviews. My aim was not to get the largest number of 
interviews possible, but to compare expert views to those of the ‘common man’, mainly 
to see how much these differ, and how much scientific knowledge has influenced local 
lay opinions of climate change. This point will be elaborated later on in the study. These 
initial contacts with the University lead to further interviews with people working in 
government agencies in Recife, such as SECTMA, the Secretariat of Technological 
Sciences and Environment, SRH, the Secretariat of Hydraulic Resources and Energy, 
and FIOCRUZ, a research centre working in co-operation with the Ministry of Health. 
These meetings in turn lead to contacts with the NGO Caritas, ASA (The Half-Barren 
Articulation), an umbrella organization working with drought-related problems in the 
semiarid regions, and a number of church-affiliated NGOs such as CPT (the Pastoral 
Land Commission) and CIMI (the Indigenous Missionary Council). And finally, 
through the field projects of the above mentioned organizations, I got to meet the 
farmers and peasantry in the sertão.  
                                                             
3 A traditional form of poetry printed on small leaflets and recited usually by the author 
accompanied by music played by a band. 
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Participant observation was at times challenging due to the intangible nature of my 
study.  I attended activities organized by the local Greenpeace activist group in Recife, 
where I got to witness and participate in awareness building about climate change in the 
urban setting; in the agro-ecological workshop organized by the UFPE, I took part in 
planting a plot in an agro-ecological farm; and in the sertão, as we went around the 
gardens of my informants, I got to feel, taste and smell what organic farming is all 
about. In addition to these hands-on experiences, I tried to engage in conversations 
about climate change with almost anyone and everyone I met, to see if differing lines of 
enquiry would rise up. Questioning into people’s opinions about the way of life in the 
hinterlands in the middle of a merry beach party, or interrupting a delicious meal with 
small farmers to ask whether the tomatoes were home-grown or not probably did make 
me a “source of social embarrassment” at times, as Barley would put it. This approach, 
however, seemed to pay off in the end, as the informants I spent most time with got very 
accustomed to seeing me everywhere with my tape-recorder, notepad and pen, and after 
teasing me slightly about having no life of my own, shrugged it off benevolently. 
Regarding ethical questions, and more specifically the question of objectivity and my 
own position in the field, some observations must be made. Due to the fact that most of 
the farmer and peasant informants in the sertão were beneficiaries of, or otherwise 
within the scope of action of the various development projects I visited, the responses I 
got from them to specific questions may have been to some degree aligned with the 
official views of the NGOs. Also the fact that I visited these projects with 
representatives of the NGOs may have influenced the way they see me, not as an 
independent investigator but as an NGO worker as well. However, in general terms I 
found that the responses given to me about politicized themes, such as the San 
Francisco River transposition or the drought industry, did not differ significantly 
between those who were involved in the projects and those who were not. The most 
notable difference in responses given about the effectiveness of the NGOs’ projects 
between those who were beneficiaries and those who were not, was the higher amount 
of praise given by beneficiaries to these undertakings. In general, however, even among 
those not directly participating, the feedback on these projects was positive. This having 
been said, I did explain to all the informants that I was working independently for this 
study. However, regarding environmental, and at times political issues as well, I did not 
try to hide my own opinions on the subject, but rather took them as points of discussion 
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and debate with the informants. Agreeing fully with Nancy Scheper-Hughes, I quote her 
in explaining how I felt on the field:  
I am inclined toward a compromise that calls for the practice of a “good enough” ethno-
graphy. The anthropologist is an instrument of cultural translation that is necessarily 
flawed and biased. We cannot rid ourselves of the cultural self we bring with us into the 
field any more than we can disown the eyes, ears and skin through which we take in our 
intuitive perceptions about the new and strange world we have entered. (Scheper-Hughes 
1992, 28). 
 
I also have to remark on the enthusiasm and willingness of the informants to share their 
views with me, quite openly discussing themes that could also be considered somewhat 
sensitive subjects. I was taken in very well and offered help by both experts and laymen 
alike everywhere I went. Being Finnish also seemed to be an asset when discussing 
climate, as people were intrigued by the ‘cold and dark’ country where I came from, and 
wanted to find out how climate change was affecting life here. I was also constantly 
being told to watch out for the sun because of my fair skin, and people kept asking me 
how much I suffered due to the heat. In the countryside, my informants were also 
worried about my health, as my country imports fruit which is not organically or agro-
ecologically grown, and contains toxins, warning me that eventually this will make me 
sick. The people I talked with were also very curious to know if the government in 
Finland was doing something to combat climate change, or if it was only ‘activists’ that 
were worried about the matter. The subject of climate change related to social issues 
seemed to inspire a lot of discussion, and many of my informants stressed the 
importance of doing studies about the matter that are not only based on the abstract 
pieces of information given by the media. However, to protect the identity and 
anonymity of the people who contributed to this study, all the names have been 
changed, although I have in most cases mentioned certain background facts, such as 
where a certain person works, if it has relevance to the information they give.  
 
1.4  Synopsis of chapters 
 
Following the introduction, I present the background and field data for this study 
through two main subchapters: one regarding the social and physical milieu, historical 
development and structural problems in Northeast Brazil, and another one dealing with 
the discussion on climate change and its projected and already perceivable impacts in 
the region in question. The first subchapter, mainly focusing on the history of the 
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region, is rather extensive due to the fact that in most encounters with the informants, 
they stressed the importance of history in understanding the present. The relation of 
people with the land, the old political and cultural structures at the root of present 
institutions, would remain inconceivable to the reader if they knew nothing about the 
region’s historical development. As Mintz points out, “social phenomena are by their 
nature historical which is to say that the relationships among events in one “moment” 
can never be abstracted from their past and future setting” (Mintz 1986, xxx).  
The climate and vegetation of the region are also discussed quite extensively to give an 
idea of what the region is physically like, as this was also emphasized to me through 
different comments, such as “you will see for yourself when you get to the sertão”, or 
“look at the roadside when you travel there, see how the vegetation changes?” The 
descriptions, I hope, help to shed light on why the environment has traditionally been 
seen as so hostile in the sertão, and what kind of a relation the people have formed with 
these surroundings. The subchapter dealing with climate change contains rather 
technical, scientific information, which I actually find important to present as it is this 
techno-scientific knowledge that works as the foundation of local layman impressions 
of climate change, as will be seen later on. The contextualized education, through which 
local peasants form their view of climate change, derives precisely, in a filtered form of 
course, from this very technical information. 
The third chapter introduces the main theoretical arguments relevant to the study, 
through which climate change and social problems and the ways of dealing with these 
are analyzed in chapter 4. There is also a continuum between the theoretical arguments. 
I intend to show that although structural violence exists in various forms in the region, 
in the postmodern era of global hazards and invisible risks, old structures are 
renegotiated constantly as new actors such as NGOs and multinational firms take step 
into the picture, and I finally argue that the discourse on climate change has actually 
opened up a niche for the civil society to question old structures that have been in place 
for centuries. In the analytical chapters also the realms of values and moral are drawn 
into the discussion, as these questions were also continually either brought up by the 
informants, or implicitly present in my observations. Finally, in the conclusion I will 
attempt to draw the strings together, and show how climate change and social and 
cultural questions can have interesting links with issues of poverty and questions of 
power. 
12 
 
2 THE FIELD: BACKGROUND AND DATA 
 
2.1 Northeast Brazil: A brief introduction 
 
An excursion into the Brazilian interior is equivalent, in a certain sense, to a visit to the 
past. (Nunes Leal 2009, 16). 
 
Northeast Brazil, locally known as O Nordeste, covers 1 548 000 square kilometers, and 
is comprised of a total of nine states, these being Ceará, Pernambuco, Paraíba, Sergipe, 
Bahia, Rio Grande do Norte, Alagoas, Piauí, and Maranhão. The region is divided into 
three geographic zones: the coast (litoral), the “forest zone”, (zona da mata), and the 
dry, semiarid hinterlands known as the sertão4.  Many of the capital cities of the 
Northeast are situated on the coastal strip, and it is a region teeming with industry, 
beaches, and tourism. The zona da mata is the first zone towards the interior from the 
coast, and is characterized by hot and humid climate, vast sugar cane plantations, and 
fertile soil. The hinterlands or sertão, is the semiarid, drought-prone, hot, and dry region 
that covers nearly 90 percent of the Northeast. Between the zona da mata and the sertão 
is a transitional zone known as the zona do agreste, which is a combination of the other 
two zones and is considered the gateway to the sertão. Climatically the year is divided 
into two seasons, the rainy season and the dry season, in the entire area comprising the 
Northeast. However, there is much regional variation in the temporal division of these 
seasons. 
Northeast Brazil is home to 45 million people, almost one third of Brazil´s population. 
It is also one of the poorest regions of the country, with a legacy of slavery, social 
inequality, and a persistent problem of the unequal division of income. The traditional 
economic and agricultural model has been that of the fazenda5, large estates producing 
mainly sugar cane and cotton, and in the sertão extensive rearing of livestock. One of 
the factors that makes the sertão unique compared to other arid or semi-arid regions in 
the world is its high population number. Approximately 22 million people live in the 
                                                             
4 See appendix 2. 
5 ‘plantation, estate’. 
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sertão, making it the most populous semi-arid region in the world. (Caritas 2002, 10).  
Ethnically the population in the Northeast derives mainly from Portuguese settlers, 
Indians and Afrobrazilians originally brought as slaves for sugar plantations. Ever since 
the 16th century, sugar has had a defining role in the history of the Northeast, shaping 
the settlement patterns, the rise of wealthy landowners, and social relations in the 
region. What is important to note also, is that the rise of the plantation economy, due to 
the demand of sugar during colonial times in Europe, afforded pioneering opportunities 
in the New World that laid the ground for power relations for centuries to come. (Mintz 
1986, 169). As the sugar plantations were concentrated on the fertile strip on land along 
the coast, the zona da mata, most of the Afrobrazilian population remained 
there,initially as slaves, and later as manual workforce. However, a number of native 
Northeasteners of Portuguese descent, and caboclos, of mixed Indian and Portuguese 
blood, dedicated themselves to cattle rearing and ventured further and further inland 
following their cattle in search of new pastures. These are the original settlers of the 
sertão, and ethnically still define the region nowadays.  
From the early days of the colonization, the Northeast has never been remarkable for its 
commitment to equality or social progress. When Brazil was first colonized by the 
Portuguese, the entire landscape was divided into fifteen capitanias6, each put under the 
control of a Portuguese nobleman. According to Arons, most historians believe the 
Portuguese never intended to settle in Brazil, but their aim was simply to extract as 
much material wealth as possible given available human resources. As happened in 
many parts of Latin America, the indigenous population died from disease and abuse, 
and Portuguese settlers turned to African slavery, importing more slaves than any other 
nation in the hemisphere. (Arons 2004, 68). There are a number of well-known 
ethnographic and sociological accounts written about the Northeast, discussing both the 
historical roots of the region´s social structures and everyday life in the region. Among 
the most noteworthy are the works of Gilberto Freyre, Josué de Castro, and the 
extensive ethnographic account Death Without Weeping: The Violence of Everyday Life 
in Brazil (1992) by Mary Scheper-Hughes.  
 The classic works of Pernambucan anthropologist and sociologist Gilberto Freyre, 
including The Mansions and the Shanties (1963), The Masters and the Slaves (1956), 
                                                             
6 Captaincy. 
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and New World in the Tropics: the Culture of Modern Brazil (1959), are among the 
most comprehensive and famous studies discussing the legacies of slavery, the 
formation and social consequences of the plantation economy, and ethnic questions in 
the region. For the purposes of this study, one of Freyre’s most interesting ideas was the 
link between the institution of slavery and strong patriarchal familism: during the times 
of slavery, but especially after abolition, the male-dominated ‘big house’ became the 
power center, creating a basis for the supreme power of large landowners, later to be 
also known as coroneis7. Thus, not only gender-relations, but also the dependency-
relations between different social classes trace their way back to age-old institutions 
such as slavery and the agricultural plantation model originally imported from feudal 
Europe. (Freyre 1966, 193-195). Regarding ethnic questions and race, Freyre has 
subsequently been criticized for his overly romantic concept of ‘racial democracy’ in 
Brazil. His argument was that miscegenation produced in Brazil a situation where 
racism was practically inexistent, and had little effect on social standing – an idea that 
has mostly been refuted by other students of Brazil. The question of race in Brazil, just 
as the question of gender, is a rather complicated one, and although it most certainly is 
related to the topic of structural violence, I have decided not to focus in-depth on these 
questions in this study due to lack of space. 
The power relations that to this very day persist in the region in a modified form were 
for the most part formed early on in the heyday of sugar plantations. In the imperial 
times, the Portuguese Crown handed over land to mainly aristocrats of Portuguese 
descent, forming the basis for a white landed gentry. Little changed when the Empire 
became Republic, except that less thought was given to the ancestry of arriving 
Portuguese settlers, and land was given out more freely, especially in the sertão. The 
role of those of Indian or mixed ancestry mainly became that of peasants working on 
someone else´s land, and living off subsistence farming. As mentioned, the 
Afrobrazilian population in the sertão was and remains relatively small in number, 
mainly composed of former runaway slaves who formed communities known as 
quilombos, also supporting themselves on subsistence farming. (Vilaça & Cavalcanti de 
Albuquerque 1987, 6-9). The “elite”, the landed gentry, formed in parallel ways in the 
coast and in the interior hinterlands, although there were notable differences in their 
                                                             
7 Colonels. 
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lifestyles: whereas the sugar lords enjoyed displaying their wealth, living in an 
ostentatiously grand manner and mingling in the salons of the big cities, the hinterland 
lords lead a life of the farm, investing largely in land, having a low formal education, 
and keeping their finances under strict control. During the days of the Old Republic 
(1891-1930), the ranks of landed gentry in the sertão swelled further by the appearance 
of colonels; those of Portuguese descent but financially less fortunate and less endowed 
with social and political prestige than the old elite, who joined the National Guard and 
thus earned the rank of coronel, later to be equated with land-owner, vote-owner, 
patriarch and strongman of the sertão. They became the community leaders: “They 
were farmer-landowners, political leaders, social arbitrators, with their herds, their 
assassins (their militia), their electoral power. Later they became rulers of local 
commercial and industrial activities. They were masters, absolute sovereigns, 
unchallengeable.” (Vilaça & Cavalcanti de Albuquerque 1987, 8). The phenomenon 
known as coronelismo8 thus took root. Coronelismo could be defined as a system of 
patronage, a notorious union between public authority and the private power of local 
bosses. Its essence is a compromise between the two:  
On the part of the local bosses, unconditional support for official government candidates 
in state and federal elections; on the part of the state government, carte blanche for the 
local boss who supports the government (preferably the leader of the majority faction) in 
all matters relating to the municipality, including the nomination of state functionaries 
employed there. (Nunes Leal 2009, 20).  
 
The links between these two powers can also be traced back to the agrarian structure in 
the country, where governments have almost always been drawn from the dominant 
landowner classes. The agrarian structure thus contributed for a long time to the 
survival of coronelismo, just as coronelismo helped preserve the agrarian structure 
intact. (Nunes Leal 2009, 141). The basis for the political power of the coroneis lies in 
this very union, also explaining why they were mostly in charge of providing and 
controlling basic services, such as water supply in the sertão. Although the institution of 
coronelismo is practically extinct nowadays, it is the sons of these colonels, the heirs to 
their political and economic influence, that still steer local politics to a great extent in 
the hinterlands of Northeast Brazil. 
                                                             
8 Translates roughly to “colonelism”, the power of the local strongmen known as 
‘colonels’. 
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2.1.1 Physical environment and challenges of living in the sertão 
 
The sertão, or semi-arid region of Northeast Brazil, is a huge, diversified area covering 
roughly 868 000 km2. The semi-arid region is defined by the deficiency and irregularity 
of rain, leading to periodic droughts. To clarify, the problem in the sertão is not lack of 
rain as such: precipitation rates are 750 mm on average, making the sertão one of the 
most humid semi-arid regions in the world. What makes the sertão vulnerable in the 
event of drought, in a climatic sense, is both the high evaporation resulting from high 
temperatures and the shallowness of the soil, which has a very low capacity for water 
retention, and the irregularity of rains. The evaporation rate in the region is three times 
higher than the precipitation rate.  The soil is mainly composed of crystalline rock, 
which also results in the salinization of the soil. The irregularity of rains means that 
there is great variation in both the temporal and regional occurrence of the rains: the 
rainy period lasts usually more or less 4 months, and can occur any time between 
September and March, but there are no guarantees on when and where precipitation will 
occur. The main challenge in the area is therefore the storage of rainwater during the 
rainy season in preparation for the periodic droughts. (Caritas et al 2001, 13). 
The vegetation in the sertão is mainly composed of what is called the caatinga, 
indigenous word meaning “white forest”. During the rainy season it is green and lush, 
fostering one of Brazil´s greatest biodiversities in various insects and plants. During the 
dry season, the caatinga goes through something comparable to hibernation, acquiring a 
dry aspect and thus earning its nickname of “white forest”. Once the rains return, there 
is a quick resurrection of the vegetation, and what looked dead and barren blossoms 
again in a matter of days. Thus, in the sertão the difference between the two seasons 
tends to be more extreme than in the rest of the Northeast. My fieldwork in the region 
was timed right in the beginning of the dry season, so the landscape was not yet quite as 
extreme as at the peak of it. Yet, driving from the coast inland towards the city of 
Pesqueira in Pernambuco, that is considered the gateway to the sertão, the changes in 
scenery on this approximately three hour journey were already very notable. From the 
lush sugarcane fields to slightly more arid, cattle-filled pastures to dried-up bushes 
along the roadside, I was constantly prodded by the driver to note the increasing desert-
like conditions as we approached the sertão. Two things were always commented on by 
the informants I discussed the climate with: the dryness, and the heat. Even before 
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going to the sertão, I had repeatedly been warned about cities such as Patos and 
Cajazeiras in the state of Paraíba as being “like ovens, hot hot hot, and puf, so dry, so 
dry nothing lives!” (Interview Recife, PE, 11.09.2010). 
 
2.1.2 Vidas Secas: The image of drought and misery 
 
Tudo sofre e não resiste  Everyone suffers and fails to resist 
este fardo tão pesado,  this burden so heavy 
no Nordeste flagelado  in the afflicted Northeast 
em tudo a tristeza existe.  sorrow exists in everything. 
Mas a tristeza mais triste  But the greatest sorrow 
que faz tudo entristecer,  Which makes everything so sad 
é a mãe chorosa, a gemer,  Is the weeping mother, moaning 
lágrimas dos olhos correndo, Tears running from her eyes, 
vendo seu filho dizendo:  hearing her son say: 
mamãe, eu quero morrer!  mother, I want to die! 
- Patativa do Assaré: “ABC do nordeste flagelado”. 
The hinterlands of Northeast Brazil is a region often described in terms of persistent 
poverty and resistance to change, both related to the image of drought. According to 
Greenfield, drought is seen by Northeasteners as both a cause and symbol of their 
region´s relative underdevelopment, and they claim that this reflects a long-standing 
pattern of government favoritism toward the South. (Greenfield in Levine et al 1999, 
100). The image of drought, a seca, has long been invoked to explain everything from 
the character and identity of sertanejos to the melancholy music, to folk Catholicism, to 
patron-client dependencies, to messianic movements, to the periodic famines and the 
suffering known as miseria da seca, “the misery of the drought” (Arons 2004, xiv). The 
image of droughts is formidable, and inextricably tied with the image of the sertão. 
Practically every description and ethnography that I read about the region before going 
to the field echoed this image: the hinterlands of Northeast Brazil are home to a 
melancholy, resigned and fatalistic, but tough and humble people who lead their simple 
lives on the terms of the periodic droughts, and have built a unique cultural sphere 
around them. This is the cultural politics and poetics present in the region, repeated in 
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poetry, songs, literature, cordeis9, art and studies of the region.  For example, Nancy 
Scheper Hughes describes the horror of drought and thirst as the “one raw and vital 
nerve among Nordestinos, rich and poor alike”. The image captures the imagination of 
people who describe all that is bad and negative in terms of dryness, sometimes even 
projecting the image of drought into their own bodies. Hence someone may for example 
describe their body as worn-out, dried up. According to her, “water anxiety is general in 
the population, although it is the poor whose health is most compromised by the scarcity 
and poor quality of the public water supply.” (Scheper-Hughes 1992, 68-69). 
Despite the fact that droughts have long stalked the Brazilian Northeast, with numerous 
recorded instances of drought dating as far back as the 1500s, the contemporary image 
of the drought dates mainly back to the mid-nineteenth century. Cattle ranches and 
sugar plantations stood as the area’s dominant representation, and drought remained 
simply an unfortunate fact of nature, or a punishment from God, that affected various 
parts of the nation’s vast interior. The Great Drought of 1877-1880, which is still 
recalled as the worst such occurrence in the region’s history, played a critical role in this 
process of definition. It created a framework for interpreting all subsequent droughts. 
Thus, the regional identity of the sertão, is a social construct, a product of human 
imagination whose origins lie in the latter portion of the nineteenth century. (Greenfield 
in Levine et al 1999, 101). From this period onwards, the image of the misery of 
drought also began to capture that of mass migration from the interior of the afflicted 
states to the coastal areas, and even as far south as São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. The 
Great Drought crippled the sertão, resulting in a stream of backlands masses headed for 
other areas in search of food and water. These drought refugees, generally called 
retirantes but also known as flagelados, ‘the afflicted’, were quickly incorporated to the 
imagery of the misery of drought: the sertanejo with his family at the mercy of an ever-
hostile environment, carrying his few belongings on donkey back in search of a better 
life10. After the Great Drought of 1877, the imperial government also stimulated 
migration from the region to other, more ‘livable’ regions, such as the South and 
Amazonia, that was also in desperate need of cheap workforce. (Correia de Andrade 
1987, 92). 
                                                             
9 Singular cordel, plural cordeis. 
10 See Appendix 4. 
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When asked what characterizes a sertanejo these days, several of my informants 
stressed the unique relation they have to land. However, what is interesting to note is 
that when asked if there is rural-to urban or interregional migration among the 
sertanejos, all my informants maintained that the era of the flagelados is in the past. 
Everyone stressed that the trend to migrate has diminished significantly. Maria 
describes what the modern sertanejo is like as follows:  
It is extremely strong, the love of the land that the sertanejo has. It is his place, it is so 
strong, for them the relation is much stronger than for us. It is also a unique relation that 
they have with the land: if he can stay there, he will. He [the sertanejo] will only leave if 
he has absolutely no other alternative. It is also a form of resistance. (Interview Recife, 
PE, 21.9.2010). 
 
Rafael from Pedra also points to a change in migration patterns:  
There is still migration, but it is for different reasons. The younger generations do not 
want to stay in the countryside, it is not because of the droughts but because they want to 
study and work in the cities… thanks to the cisterns, we old folk can remain at the family 
farm, while the young ones go… (Interview Pedra, PE, 07.10.2010). 
 
Seu Roberto, a retired government official from the interior city of Cajazeiras, Paraíba, 
has a somewhat differing view of what the sertanejo is like these days.  
The Northeastern culture is suffering from a loss of values nowadays. [...] What used to 
characterize the Northeastern man was the force of his work and ethical and moral values. 
Unfortunately that has been lost. Thus, he has ceased to be robust, strong, and ethical and 
has become the sum of the model that has been applied on him. [...] This started with 
Sarney’s government, in 1986. All of the degradation of the Northeastern man started in 
1986, resulting from Sarney’s policies. [...] It is the neoliberal model that led to the 
corruption of the leading political class. (Interview Cajazeiras, PB, 12.10.2010). 
 
The above quotes reflect the general division of opinions that my informants had on the 
sertanejos: more or less half of those interviewed stressed the unique and affectionate 
tie that the inhabitants of the region have with the land, and often mentioned it to be 
something that a city-dweller can neither grasp nor feel. The other half however 
highlighted the change in morale and attitude towards the land, claiming that there has 
been a moral devaluation in the relationship that the sertanejo has with his natural 
surroundings.  
The image of the sertanejos’ relation to their environment is echoed also in local poetry, 
art, music and literature. The citation at the beginning of this chapter is an example of 
the traditional poetry of the sertão, called cordel (“poetry on a string”). Cordel is a form 
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of poetry that falls into stanzas of usually six or seven lines, is sold printed on 
pamphlets of eight, sixteen or thirty-two pages, and is normally performed in the form 
of song by its author. Customarily, cordel poetry is sold in market stands alongside 
food, cotton and leather products, and more often than not it is the cordelista11 himself 
who sells his pamphlets, improvising new lines constantly to attract the interest of the 
customers. Often, especially in olden times, cordelistas roamed the hinterlands 
accompanied by a band performing their poems. Historically, due to high illiteracy rates 
in the sertão, and in the absence of television and newspapers, many people used to rely 
on these repentistas or violeiros12 to bring news of the outside world to the hinterlands. 
(Arons 2004, 41). Nowadays the cordelistas often focus on describing the traditional 
way of life in the sertão, but I did come across cordeis taking a stand on global 
warming, neoliberalism, terrorism and many other contemporary issues as well. This 
shows that although less prominent nowadays, the art form is very adaptive and 
definitely not extinct. 
Among a number of fiction and non-fiction literature depicting life on the sertão, 
certain classic works stand out. One of these is Josué de Castro´s Documentario do 
Nordeste (1959), depicting life in the sertão of the 1930s and 1940s through short 
stories and sociological analysis. The popular imagery of life in the sertão is well 
summed up in his short story called The Drought:  
The drought killed everything. It dried up all the water and all the life from the region. 
Juvêncio, facing this desolate spectacle, feels the last drop of hope dry up inside him as 
well. […] On the hard and rocky road, the soles of his sandals hit the ground like a rattle, 
and tragic thoughts start to rattle his paining head too: When will this terrible drought 
end? Which will face its end first: the drought or his family? What is better: to die of 
hunger and thirst on his own land, or to emigrate and die of fatigue and shame in the land 
of others? (De Castro 1959, 51-52). 
 
 In another notable classic novel, Os sertões, Euclides da Cunha links the formation of 
the character of the sertanejo to his natural surroundings, arguing that the extremes of 
the environment are also reflected in the regional character of the population. Just as 
nature in the sertão withers away with the drought only to revive again during the rains, 
so does the sertanejo become resigned to his struggle during the drought only to thrive 
                                                             
11 Cordel-poet. 
12 Both terms refer to singing bards. 
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again when the rains return. He is tough, humbled by his surroundings, and physically 
as parched as the land around him. (Da Cunha 1905, 90-93). “He goes through life from 
one trap to another, repeated surprises of an incomprehensible nature, and appreciates 
every minute of ceasefire accorded to him” (Da Cunha 1905, 94). In this battle of land 
against man, the sertanejo finds his only comfort in religious faith (Da Cunha 1905, 
105). 
One of the most famous depictions in music that captures the popular imagery in the 
sertão is the classic song Asa Branca, (White Wing), by Luiz Gonzaga, translated into 
English by Raul Seixas: 
When i stare the ground of /My land/Burning loose as dancing flames/I asked man there 
upon/The heavens/If i deserve me this kind of pain/I asked the man there upon/The 
heavens/If i deserve me this kind of pain/Everywhere the ground is so dry/There's no 
trees, no green, just red/I lost my cattle, my appaloosa/For lack of water some took 
away/I lost my cattle, my appaloosa/For lack of water some took away/Even white 
winged birds flew away/Flew away from my land sight/It was when i said goodbye/Sweet 
Rosie/Keep in to your heart, this heart/Of mine/It was when i said goodbye/Sweet 
Rosie/Keep in to your heart, this heart/Of mine/Many thousands miles away, now/Feeling 
lonely, lost and blue/I keep on waiting rain falls again there/So i'll be back thou home 
again/I keep on waiting rain falls again there/So i'll be back thou home again/When the 
glow green of your eyes/Flows again all over land/I can assure you, so don't/You cry, 
no/'cause i'll be back, see/To you again!!/I can assure you, so don't/You cry, no/'cause i'll 
be back, see/To you again! 
 
The song echoes the same recurring themes as the regional literature and cordeis: the 
misery of the drought, resignation and leaving destiny in the hands of God, death, and 
migration from the homeland. 
Although repeating the traditional imagery of the sertão in his fiction, in his 
sociological analysis, however, Josué de Castro argues that the misery and poverty in 
the sertão cannot and should not be attributed to droughts, but rather to the social order. 
He blames the progressive proletarization of the sertanejos and the minimum means of 
production they have for the calamitous situation that is only made worse in times of 
drought. (De Castro 1959, 100). He further argues that the efforts of the Federal 
Inspectorate of Anti-Drought Works, later to be known as SUDENE, are exaggeratedly 
limited to the simple fight against droughts through accumulating water through the 
construction of dams, not focusing on the social and human aspects of the problem. In 
his view, what should be the main focus of government institutions would be the 
granting of opportunities for increased production through better land distribution and 
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increased democratization in the region. (De Castro 1959, 105). These ideas were 
considered rather revolutionary at the time, when many argued that the solution to the 
periodical misery in the sertão could best be solved through large-scale infrastructural 
undertakings or the exportation of the population to less hostile regions, such as the 
Amazon basin. As has become apparent later, this approach was not very successful: 
one of the social results of dealing with droughts in this manner was the formation of 
concentrations of misery and poverty, as small rural producers who migrated from the 
countryside to cities brought with them the problem of unemployment and 
homelessness. (Arons 2004, 173). 
 
2.1.3 The drought industry 
 
“O problema não é a seca, é a cerca” (the problem is not the drought, it is the fence) 
(Arons 2004, 3). 
 
A persistent problem with deep historical roots in the sertão is what is known as ‘the 
drought industry’ (industria da seca). During times of drought general access to water 
resources diminishes, leading peasants and farmers to depend on water supplied 
traditionally by the regional elite, and local ‘politicos’. According to José, a researcher 
on desertification at the Federal University of Pernambuco, droughts provide the elite 
with an opportunity to obtain federal resources with subsidized interest rates, and to 
organize communal labor forces for the benefit of their own farms. Although 
government policy has throughout the years attempted to alleviate the suffering of the 
population during times of drought, in practice these attempts, from the distribution of 
food staples and water to the organization of communal work groups intended to 
provide food security, have been controlled by the regional elites who use the situation 
to increase their wealth and political control over the population. (Interview Recife, PE, 
23.8.2010). As in the case of the image of the misery of drought, the drought industry in 
its contemporary form has its origins in the Great Drought of 1877. During the Great 
Drought, the national government expanded enormous sums of money on drought relief, 
much of it ostensibly earmarked to provide work relief for the displaced backlanders. 
Senators and deputies gave eloquent speeches about the suffering of these displaced 
sertanejos, and dictated that both conscience and the nation’s Constitution mandated a 
compassionate public response. However, they also pointed to the superiority of work 
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relief as opposed to government handouts, and soon issued a relief effort rife with 
corruption, fraud, and inefficiencies. The result was the emergence of “the lazy 
sertanejo and profiteering político13” as key elements in the problem of drought. 
(Greenfield in Levine et al 1999, 101). 
The drought industry has its roots in the power structures originating already from the 
times of the colonization of Brazil, and is deeply tied to the problem of unequal land 
distribution and to the relationship of landowners with the peasantry and the landless 
poor. According to Greenfield, the terms ‘drought industry’ and ‘drought industrialists’ 
capture a widely held belief that Northeastern politicians and elites have shamelessly 
taken advantage of droughts to provide patronage for their cronies, benefiting 
handsomely of the misery of the backlands’ masses. Thus, the term drought does not 
merely describe a climatological phenomenon, but rather, serves as a powerful 
metaphor summarizing a complex of features popularly associated with the Northeast. 
The image of drought comprises such characteristics as impoverished, ignorant 
backlanders prone to religious mysticism and fanaticism, and greedy local bosses who 
readily employ violence to achieve their corrupt ends. (Greenfield in Levine et al 1999, 
100). As Arons argues, the issue of drought cannot be confined to meteorological 
specialists alone due to the fact that the primary factor causing starvation, death, and 
rural-to-urban migration in the Northeastern interior is not a lack of water, but the 
political manipulation of that lack.  
The overriding problem in Northeast Brazil is that water is used as a weapon of power 
and prestige in a war against the poor. The droughts that strike the Northeast can be 
thought of not as natural disasters, but as weather fluctuations. Only when they are 
coupled with man-made phenomena – such as fences and barricades – do the droughts 
cause widespread devastation and death. (Arons 2004, 5). 
 
In practice, during times of drought water is supplied by what are known as carros 
pipa14, trucks equipped with freshwater tanks, providing water to communities that lack 
ways of storing water during the rainy season. The traditional image of the drought 
industry is therefore the exchange of water supplied by carros pipa for votes in regional 
elections, and other political favors. However, several of my informants associated the 
drought industry nowadays also with large-scale infrastructure projects such as the San 
                                                             
13 Politician. 
14 see Appendix 3. 
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Francisco River transposition, and the undertakings of the former state agency known as 
SUDENE. (Interviews 23.08.2010; 20.09.2010; 21.09.2010 Recife, PE; Interviews 
11.10.2010; 12.10.2010 Cajazeiras, PB).   In general terms then, I would define the 
drought industry as an institution based on the exchange of water for political 
dependence.  
What I found interesting, however, was that based on the interviews I conducted there 
was quite a bit of disagreement on whether the drought industry is still an acute problem 
and a widespread phenomenon, or whether it is ‘a thing of the past’. Driving through the 
hinterlands, I spotted a number of carros pipa that were, according to my informants, 
still carrying out the same task. In a group interview conducted in the community of 
Ventanía, PE, the respondents stated the following regarding the drought industry: 
Apolónio: “But here, in these surroundings, for example I know regions here close-by 
that rely entirely on the water trucks. And there the so-called industry does not cease to 
exist. A lot of people depend on it. “ 
Sebastião: “The water truck business also depends a lot on... um... the duration of the 
drought, for example, if we talk about only one dry year, the family might survive on 
their own cistern-stored water. But if we talk about more than a year, the structure in 
place, the cistern, is not enough.  So practically all families are vulnerable and may at 
some time be in need of communal cisterns, even if they have ones of their own. So the 
army, right, coordinates a program of distribution, so, the water trucks distribute water to 
the communal cisterns, and families use them for other needs in the house, not for 
drinking, but for washing, giving to the animals, etc. So a lot depends on the year in 
question and on the rains.” (Interview Cacimbas, PE, 14.10.2010). 
 
Felipe, a young man originally from the interior town of Petrolina in the Pernambucan 
sertão, notes regarding the drought industry:  
I think it still is very much alive today. The politicians, they use… for example: the San 
Francisco River transposition, right? There are other solutions that would be much 
cheaper, but less visible and less large-scale, and that would just as well solve the 
problem. All this is a part of the drought industry; they win votes for redirecting a river 
from its natural course, by taking it somewhere else… For example, in [the state of] 
Piauí, they say that that is where most of the subterranean water in the sertão is 
concentrated. So they could dig wells, use that sort of easier solutions, and cheaper ones, 
but instead they do this…” When asked whom he thinks the transposition will benefit, he 
states: “I think, I think what is going to happen is as follows: the large estates will have 
water, and they will hire poor people to work there. This will not solve the problem for 
small farmers. You are taking him from his own land to work on someone’s… on some 
rich guy’s land, and that relation will define his entire life. I think that is what is going to 
happen. I think the small farmer will not have access, no. (Interview Recife, PE, 
20.9.2010). 
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Isabel, a representative of Caritas Brazil agrees:  
It exists, still exists. Some families that are not beneficiaries of the cisterns still suffer a 
lot because of their dependency on the water trucks. We have built altogether almost 
300 000 cisterns in the semiarid, but according to calculations we would need more than 
1 200 000 cisterns in order to attend to all the families, so…Just think that we have 
achieved a number that is still… compared to the demand, small, right? (Interview 
Pesqueira, PE, 05.10.2010). 
 
Silvana, an elderly lady whose family owns a farm in the municipality of Pesqueira, 
explains that in the old days, life was very hard, them having to search water far away 
and the water being very contaminated and leading to illnesses in both children and 
adults. She does claim, however, that this is all in the past now; with the arrival of the 
cisterns to collect rainwater, and rock tanks, they had, according to her, become largely 
independent of the drought industry, and that this was an institution largely extinct. 
(Interview Pesqueira, PE, 07.10.2010). 
In order to sustain the drought industry, it is also necessary to sustain the ‘drought 
myth’ (mito da seca). This myth is the image of the sertão repeated in music, literature 
and art15 not as a semi-arid, but as an arid, hostile region full of misery and always 
lacking in rain. This image, as discussed earlier, is profoundly distorted: even the state 
of Pernambuco, which has the lowest index of water per person per year in Brazil, does 
not qualify as an area suffering of “water stress” according to the UN. The limit for 
water stress is 1000 m3/person/year; in Pernambuco the average index is 1270 m3. (De 
Oliveira & da Motta Marques 2008, 13). This again indicates that the problem in the 
hinterlands of Northeast Brazil is not lack of water, but access to it, thus making 
droughts not a climatological, but a structural and social problem. Fighting against the 
drought myth was also a key point in the work of the ASA16 and Caritas, whose social 
projects I visited in the sertão. The representatives of these organizations that I 
interviewed all stressed the importance of breaking away from this false image in order 
to find more constructive, grass-roots level solutions to the periodic lack of water. This 
need of changing popular conceptions about the sertão was also repeated by the small 
                                                             
15 See appendix 4. 
16 The Half-Barren Articulation, an umbrella organization of NGOs and government 
bodies dealing with the environmental challenges of living in the semi-arid region. 
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farmers and locals involved in other social movements, as they found the image 
hazardous to initiatives for developing the region. 
 
2.1.4 Land use and distribution 
 
A causa de todo atraso  The cause of all underdevelopment 
Desta imensa região  Of this huge region 
É muita desigualdade  Is the inequality 
E grande concentração  And the huge concentration 
De terra, água e riqueza:  Of land, water and riches: 
Os meios de produção  The means of production 
- José de Oliveira: “Convivência com o Semi-árido”. 
 
As in many parts of Latin America, in Brazil during the time of colonization land was 
grabbed by force from indigenous communities, and handed out to what became 
regional elites as a royal concession, and later as an imperial donation. This practice led 
to a situation where landowners had exclusive right over the land, leaving the peasantry 
the role of resident workers on someone else’s farm. Little changed with the Law of 
Lands Act of 1850, which transformed land rights from those given by the King to 
capitalist property. The traditional mentality persisted, and the main outcome of the law 
was an increase in rural violence, as landowners did everything in their power to 
guarantee their control over the land, going as far as setting up private armies to prevent 
the indigenous, black, and poor white people from getting their hands on it. (Caritas et 
al 2001, 15). The current model of land distribution is the result of this history of 
privilege and violence, and land remains highly concentrated in the hands of a small 
minority of families. Huge plots of land in the semi-arid region are dedicated to 
extensive rearing of livestock, or monocultural agriculture. The IBGE, Brazilian 
Institute of Geography and Statistics, reveals in a study carried out in 2006 that 
properties smaller than 10 hectares occupy less than 2.7% of rural area, whereas 
properties measuring more than 1000 hectares represent 43% of the total number of 
farms. (IBGE 2006, 107). 
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A contested land reform dispute has been going on for decades, and the civil society is 
nowadays pushing for new legislation replacing the land statute from 1850, in order to 
limit the maximum size of estates and to diminish the huge social inequality arising 
from the current land distribution system. Another worry is that if land ownership is not 
limited, foreigners and multinational companies have free access to buy as much land as 
they want. (Interview Cajazeiras, PB, 11.10.2010).  Like the land, water resources also 
have tended to become privatized and enclosed, protected by fences and barricades. 
Great constructions such as dams and wells have proliferated throughout the sertão, 
which do not however adequately provide the population with water, but instead favor 
large estates and the agribusiness sector. Among the critics of the persistent inequality 
of land division is the CPT. The CPT (Pastoral Land Commission) was formed in 1975, 
during the military dictatorship, to contest the unequal land distribution and drive the 
idea of land reform. Its origin was in the land disputes mainly in the Pará and Amazon 
areas, but quickly spread to other regions as well, defying the power of large land 
owners and demanding rights for small farmers. The Commission is active to this day, 
and still struggles with the same issues, nowadays increasingly questioning the activities 
of the agribusiness sector. (Interview Cajazeiras, PB, 11.10.2010). 
The question of land distribution was mentioned by many of my informants as the 
biggest obstacle to food security and well-being in the region. Driving through the 
sertão, I was shown huge plots of land belonging to prominent businessmen and 
members of the local elite, who had moved to cities and left these vast areas unattended 
and largely underutilized. Seu Roberto from Cajazeiras highlights another problem 
related to the polemic question of land reform in the area:  
The land reform in the semiarid is an interesting question; I do not think it can be done in 
unirrigated areas and with a patch of land smaller than 100 hectares per family. Otherwise 
you cannot survive. For a family to subsist in the semiarid, in an area that has no 
irrigation, the minimum size for a patch of land is 100 hectares. That is why the model in 
use, of giving out tiny plots of land (asentamento17) makes no sense; it just reinforces the 
band-aid approach. (Interview Cajazeiras, PB, 12.10.2010). 
 
 The “model in use” that Seu Roberto refers to is one advocated by the MST 
(Movimento Sem Terra), The Landless Peasants’ Movement, among others. The idea is 
to provide landless peasant workers, who used to farm someone else’s land but have 
                                                             
17 Translates roughly to ‘settlement’. 
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become unnecessary due to increased intensification of machinery use in agriculture, 
with small plots of land ranging from about 1 hectare to 10 hectares in concentrated 
areas called asentamentos. The goal of this approach is that these farmers can practice 
subsistence agriculture to provide for their own families’ needs. The number of 
asentamentos has grown during the presidency of Luíz Inácio Lula da Silva, but as can 
be seen from Seu Roberto’s statement, the reception has been varied to say the least. 
 
2.1.5  Agribusiness 
 
Para a indústria e para a agricultura For the industry and for the agriculture 
A ação tem que ser tecnológica  Action has to be technological 
Em primeiro lugar se siga à lógica  First of all, to follow the logic 
De que o ganho de um só não é fartura That gains for only one are not enough 
Produzir poluindo, isto é loucura To produce by polluting, this is insane 
Nossos rios precisam respirar Our rivers need to breathe 
Nossas águas têm sede pra matar Our waters are so thirsty they could kill 
Diminuam seus gastos descobrindo They would diminish the costs by discovering 
Outras formas de estarem produzindo Other forms of production 
Porém sem tanta água utilizar Without using so much water 
- Abdias Campos: “Água”. 
 
Among the most contested and criticized topics regarding both climate change and land 
use, taken up repeatedly by my informants and heatedly discussed in the seminars I 
attended, was the ways the agribusiness sector is operating. In recent decades, and even 
more so during the government of Luíz Inácio Lula da Silva, investment in the 
Northeast, and especially in the agricultural sector, has grown significantly.  One could 
talk of a revolution in farm production. In ten years, from 1996 to 2006, the total value 
of the country’s crops rose from 23 billion reais18 to 108 billion reais, or 365%. Brazil’s 
beef exports increased tenfold in a decade, overtaking Australia as the world’s largest 
exporter. The country now has the world’s largest cattle herd after India. It has also 
                                                             
18 Currency of Brazil; singular real, plural reais. 
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become the world’s largest exporter of poultry, sugar cane and ethanol. (The Economist, 
26.08.2010). 
How has this change come about? Mainly through the use of genetically modified 
crops, the technological innovations embraced by large-scale commercial farms, and the 
extensive use of agrotoxins in farming. Production has definitely grown significantly 
through the sale of unproductive farmland to agribusiness companies, and boosted the 
Northeastern economy substantially, also provoking improvements in infrastructure and 
industry.  At the same time this development has, however, ignited a fervent protest by 
and on behalf of small farmers, who argue not only against the economic hegemony of 
these companies, but also protest that the use of genetically modified crops and 
agrotoxins presents a serious health threat to the population. There also seems to exist a 
tight link between the growth of the agribusiness sector and government policy: 
according to the Small Farmers’ Movement (MPA), in 2009-2010 93 billion Brazilian 
reais were destined to agribusiness, whereas only 15 billion reais went to familiar 
agriculture. Thus, the large estates are receiving government subsidies disproportionally 
compared to small family farms. (Mendonça 2010, 7). 
When visiting family-run farms, I was several times invited to taste “real, unpolluted 
vegetables and fruits” that do not cause cancer or my future children to have three legs 
instead of two. On  more than one occasion I was told that the region’s biggest evil was 
no longer the sovereign, corrupt political bosses, but the impersonal agribusiness 
companies polluting the soil and the air and buying the best farmland at very reasonable 
prices. These companies were often portrayed as the modern day equivalent of coroneis 
and fazendeiros19, who exercise absolute power in the region thanks to their economic 
position.  
In an interview with CPT representatives, I was told the following:  
There is a company called Santa Ana, a Brazilian company that produces for exportation. 
And they own a lot of land, 1000 hectares, in the hands of one sole company, fertile 
lands, water for production, and infrastructure. And on the other hand, there is the 
opposite: the farmers, who still fight for the right to a plot of land. The problem is, that 
these families are still waiting for land, and the government does not care, does not pay 
attention, to these questions.[…] All the infrastructure, that is government-owned, is at 
the service of capitalism.[…] Our biggest worry are those coming from the outside, the 
                                                             
19 Plantation or estate owner. 
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multinationals… they overuse the land, because they can reap benefit from it for a while 
and then take up and leave… they have not got the same relation to the land as the small 
farmers here, who have to plan generations ahead…the difference is that when the farmer 
leaves his terrain, his land, he loses the entire construct and plan of his life, everything he 
has worked for his entire life. (Interview Cajazeiras, PB, 11.10.2010).  
 
Related to the worry of exploitative land use is therefore also the concern for the loss of 
means of subsistence for a large number of peasants. Without access to land there is 
always the threat of having to move to the city and try to find employment, an 
extremely difficult task for many having no or little formal education and few skills 
besides those related to farming. 
 
2.1.6 Government policies and action 
 
 Seu moço eu sou emigrante  Young man, I am an emigrant 
 Venho de muito distante  I come from very far away 
 Do ressequido sertão  From the dry sertão 
 Vivo sofrendo por cá  I live in suffering here 
 Só voltarei para lá   I will only go back there 
 Quando houver irrigação  When there is irrigation  
 (Bandeira in Arons 2004, 128). 
 
As mentioned earlier, development in the Northeast was not for a long time on the list 
of the federal government’s priorities. This has changed drastically with Lula20 rising to 
power in 2003, and has resulted in large-scale development projects and increased 
financial investment and industrialization in the Northeastern states. However, what 
defined and remains unchanged about these development projects is their technocratic 
approach: the aim is not to combat poverty through a change in social structures in the 
region, but to ‘solve’ the problem of underdevelopment by means of large-scale 
infrastructural undertakings.  
From as early as the 19th century, successive governments would seek a solution to 
Northeastern droughts by funding scientific studies and extensive public works projects, 
                                                             
20 Commonly used abbreviation or nickname for Luíz Inácio Lula da Silva. 
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the so-called hydraulic or technocratic approach. In 1906, the first national government 
agency officially designated to fight the problem of regional drought appeared. This was 
the Superintendency of Studies and Works against the Effects of Drought, known more 
widely by its subsequent acronym, IFOCS (Federal Inspectorate of Anti-Drought 
Works). (Greenfield in Levine et al 1999, 102-103). IFOCS was the predecessor of what 
later became SUDENE, the Superintendency for the Development of the Northeast, an 
agency created in 1959 that had as its main goal the stimulation of economic growth in 
the Northeast. Despite growing public demand for increased use of irrigation, it was not 
until 1968 that SUDENE formed the Executive Irrigation Group for Agricultural 
Development, charging it with undertaking a study of irrigation possibilities. As a result 
of its report, the first irrigation plan for the Northeast was drafted in 1971, which 
established the goal of irrigating hundreds of thousands of hectares by 1980. Despite its 
visionary goals, SUDENE irrigated only 9 percent of its targeted land and helped only 4 
percent of the suffering families it had intended to relieve. (Arons 2004, 100). The same 
pattern repeated itself over the following three decades: SUDENE favored capital 
intensive irrigation schemes that led to minimum results. According to Alberto from the 
town of Petrolina, located in the far interior of the state of Pernambuco, the 
undertakings of SUDENE´s irrigation schemes have actually widened the contrast 
between the rich and the poor:  
In the last 30 years due to SUDENE´s irrigation systems, those who get to plant on 
irrigated land, that is, mainly the wealthy, are still making profit, while those who have to 
plant on unirrigated land, the ones who were already living in poverty, have fallen deeper 
and deeper into misery. (Interview Recife, PE, 12.08.2010). 
 
 Another unfortunate consequence of poor planning and lack of professionalism among 
irrigation directors was the accumulation of ‘irrigation refugees’, people forced to 
relocate from their lands to make way for these huge infrastructural undertakings. 
Ironically, whereas before the retirantes21 were mostly drought refugees, thanks to this 
approach their own government was spawning an internal refugee population of 
irrigation refugees in the name of progress and land reform. (Arons 2004, 101). The 
SUDENE ceased to exist in 2002, but with the present construction of the San Francisco 
River transposition, the ranks of irrigation refugees are once again growing.  
 
                                                             
21 Rural-to-urban migrants. 
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The San Francisco River transposition project is a very polemic proposal that has long 
historical roots. As early as in the late nineteenth century the government of Brazil drew 
up plans for the transposition to help alleviate the impact of droughts in the sertão. 
(Arons 2004, 17). The proposal has been debated and at times rejected ever since, until 
in 2005 the Lula government decided to take up the project again. The San Francisco 
River is one the largest rivers in Brazil, covering 2800 km and stretching from the North 
of the state of Minas Gerais up to the border of Pernambuco. The river’s course has 
already been altered several times through a number of dams, mainly destined to the 
benefit of agribusiness. The transposition consists of a set of canals and dams to link it 
over hundreds of kilometers to rivers in the semiarid area: three in the North, in the 
states of Ceará and Rio Grande do Norte, and three rivers in the East, in the state of 
Paraíba. 
The main argument of the government and of those supporting the transposition is that 
it would once and for all solve the water supply problem in 4 northeastern states: 
Pernambuco, Paraíba, Ceará and Rio Grande do Norte. The argument goes that the 
project would benefit 8 million people, would generate 1 million jobs, and irrigate 
300,000 hectares of land. However, even official reports of government sources state 
that at least 845 families will be removed from their livelihoods. (Malvezzi 2005). The 
representatives of the CPT in Cajazeiras, Paraíba, showed me pictures of terrains 
confiscated from family farmers in 2004, to whom were promised new plots of land to 
replace the ones lying on the way of the projected transposition. To this day, they are 
waiting for these promised plots. (Interview Cajazeiras, PB, 11.10.2010). 
According to the public ministry’s official report issued in 2001, at least 7,138 members 
of indigenous tribes will be directly affected by the transposition, and at least additional 
34 indigenous lands and 153 afro descendant communities could as well be affected. 
(ref. FIAN 2007). Those who are against the project, mainly environmentalists and the 
population in the areas that have already been subjected to relocations thanks to the 
project, argue that the transposition will not only have a considerable harmful ecological 
impact, but will also benefit only large landowners and the agribusiness, not the 
millions of poor peasants it claims to help. The transposition would most likely promote 
an agrarian structure in the Northeast dominated by export-oriented agribusiness.  
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The general atmosphere of worry is also reflected in popular culture, including cordeis: 
Como sofre o Velho Chico  How the Old Chico suffers 
Com a tal transposição,  Due to this so called transposition 
Repartida a pouca água  The little water distributed 
Virará tudo sertão.  Will change all of sertão. 
Se transformará num pólo  It will be transformed into a centre 
Em irrigação de solo  For the irrigation of soil 
Por tempo curto e perdido. For a short and useless time. 
É melhor analisar  It is better to analyze 
Pra depois não vir chorar  And not come crying afterwards 
Totalmente arrependido.  Completely repentant. 
- Felipe Júnior: “Os efeitos do aquecimento global”. 
 
The project is defended by powerful lobbies as providing water for the semi-arid 
Northeast, when in reality it reaches only a small percentage of the semiarid area, and 
the peasants whom it is supposed to benefit could be marginalized in the process. (FIAN 
2007). Also the costs of the project are huge, already exceeding USD 6.5 billion, not to 
mention the costs of actually getting the water to the population, which would imply a 
sharp rise in the price of water in an already impoverished region. In an interview 
conducted with two representatives of the CPT in Cajazeiras, I was told that the cost of 
the transported water would be 5 times higher than it is at the moment. (Interview 
Cajazeiras, PB, 11.10.2010). The maintenance and long-term sustainability of the 
transposition also still remain vague. Those who oppose the project argue that there 
would be a number of less expensive, more viable, and more sustainable solutions that 
would actually benefit the target population a lot more efficiently. Among these 
solutions are cisterns designed to capture rainwater, the digging of wells, rock tanks for 
irrigation, among others. 
The majority of people I interviewed were also very skeptical towards the alleged 
benefits of the project. Their main worry was the replacements of the population, the 
large-scale environmental impacts implied in the construction, and who the actual 
beneficiaries of the project are. It is not seen as a sustainable solution, and many argue 
that the actual benefit might go towards cities such as Recife and Fortaleza, and not the 
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diffuse population of the sertão. María, a representative of the FIOCRUZ, a research 
institute subordinate to the Ministry of Health notes, when asked whether the 
transposition will in her opinion raise the quality of life in the sertão and benefit the 
population:  
Benefit, yes, but the question is who? Because in Brazil it always goes like this: the 
benefit goes in general to those who have economic power. So, only the fazendeiros will 
benefit. The poor population can get… only an indirect benefit… The priority is not 
bringing water to the sertão, the priority is the land question, and control of that land. 
(Interview Recife, PE, 21.9.2010).  
 
One of the indirect ways the poor can, and do, benefit from the transposition is by 
robbing water: they pierce holes in the pipes, thus through illegal means acquiring what 
in the media is presented as a precious gift to them. (Interview Cajazeiras, PB, 
11.10.2010). José, a researcher in the Federal University of Pernambuco, was of the 
opinion that it is mainly the agribusiness that the water from the transposition will be 
directed to. “People might go to take their own with canisters, to get water, because the 
canal is open, right? But essentially I think it will benefit the agribusiness, because here 
it is always like that.” (Interview  Recife, PE, 23.08.2010). However, there were 
differing opinions about the transposition among my informants as well, with for 
example Seu Luíz praising the marvelous future the transposition will bring: “Ave 
María, thank God, in the future the water of the San Francisco will pass through here, 
only 10 kilometers away! What a joy, the droughts will finally end. It can only become 
better!” (Interview Águas Belas, PE, 07.10.2010). This statement reflects the other end 
of the spectrum, an exaggeratedly optimistic image of the transposition that is repeated 
in the mass media, creating for millions of people expectations that impede real debate 
and search for other solutions for the problem of drought in the sertão. Despite the 
promises made, many argue that the transposition is yet another outcome of the logic of 
the drought industry. Through huge infrastructural projects aimed at resolving the 
problem of drought, the elite manages to build political power and increase its influence 
in the region. In order to maintain the drought industry and justify these huge 
investments, it is also necessary to maintain the mito da seca, the drought myth. 
Another notable worry among the informants, also brought up in the seminars I 
attended, was the carrying capacity of the San Francisco River. Alberto from Petrolina 
notes that according to what he had read, the San Francisco River was being more and 
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more invaded by sandbanks resulting from the cuttings of the vegetation on the 
riverbank. Thus, the river’s flow is diminishing rapidly, and may in any case not be able 
to serve the other states where the water is intended to be transported, at least not in the 
long run. (Interview Recife, PE, 12.08.2010). This analysis was repeated by José 
Suassuna, an agronomist from the Federal University of Paraíba, who in a presentation 
(2010) argues that the river’s hydraulic capacity is weakening rapidly, and has already 
reached its limits of use. This is also due to increased evaporation rates, and thus the 
debate has largely risen alongside the more general discussion on the effects of climate 
change in Brazil, and on the actions and policies the country should formulate regarding 
mitigating its effects in the future.  
Brazil's size in geographic, demographic and economic terms makes the climate change 
problem rather complex. Despite this, it leads many other countries in promoting 
renewable energy sources, which already occupy an important share of the energy 
sector.  The country has managed to curb its greenhouse gas emissions quite well, but 
has yet to deal with the specific vulnerabilities of different regions facing climate 
change. The biggest contributors to climate change in the country are deforestation, 
especially in the Amazon region, and methane gas emissions, resulting mainly from 
large-scale cattle rearing. (La Rovere & Santos Pereira 2007). From the institutional and 
legal point of view, however, Brazil has been taking initiative in order to tackle climate 
change. In 2008 a national climate change plan was drawn up, defining targets to be 
reached by promoting sustainable development in the industrial and agricultural sectors, 
maintaining a high proportion of renewable energy in the electricity production, 
encouraging the use of biofuels in the transportation sector, and reducing deforestation. 
(The Guardian, 08.10.2008).  In 2009, Brazil passed its international climate change 
commitments to national law, when President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva signed the 
National Climate Change Policy (PNMC), also known as law 12.187. The PNMC is 
ambitious and extensive: besides providing an explanation of thirty-two emissions 
reducing activities currently being implemented in Brazil, the PNMC also lists 
additional activities in the conception phase. However comprehensive the plan may be, 
many of the proposed activities are still in an early stage of development, 
recommendations rather than mandatory actions, or so far lacking specific targets or 
implementation measures. Despite this early stage, the law fills many legislative gaps in 
the national combat against climate change, and officially adopts Brazil’s voluntary 
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national greenhouse gas reduction target of between 36.1% and 38.9% of projected 
emissions by 2020. (Robinson 2010). 
Thus, in the legislative field and in respecting international commitments Brazil seems 
to be doing quite well. As mentioned above, however, Brazil’s efforts at mitigating 
climate change related problems in specific regions of the country have yet been 
meager. In this respect the state of Pernambuco has actually been at the forefront by 
formulating a plan of action. In 2009, the state of Pernambuco, more specifically the 
Secretariat of Science, Technology and Environment (SECTMA), issued the State 
Action Program against Desertification and Mitigation of the Effects of Droughts (PAE-
PE). This program is the result of a process of articulation, mobilization and 
consultation of various entities, including the national, state and municipal 
governments, civil society and the enterprise sector, aiming to ameliorate the threat 
posed by desertification affecting 90% of the state´s area. (SECTMA 2009, 11). It is 
also in part the result of a shift in paradigm; that is, before the end of the 1990s, most of 
the government action taken in the drought-prone areas was considered ‘combat’ action, 
that is, specific emergency campaigns realized after the situation was already grave. The 
area was considered a hostile environment, the effects of which had to be ‘combated’, 
help consisting mainly of giving out food and water after a drought hit an area. After the 
drought of 1997-1998, a new way of thinking, called “Living with the Semi-Arid” 
(Convivência com o Semi-Árido) took root, focusing not on how to deal with the effects 
of calamitous droughts, but how to adapt to life in the region on a sustainable basis. The 
PAE-PE also follows this new, adaptation-oriented view. The basic objectives of the 
program include establishing directives and legal and institutional instruments aimed at 
optimizing the formulation of public policy and private investment in the areas 
susceptive to desertification. The goal is to move on to direct action as well, through 
partnerships with different organizations, in colleting and storing water, developing 
basic sanitation facilities, and training both experts and locals. (SECTMA 2009, 23). At 
the moment, other Northeastern states are in the process of developing their action 
programs. Once the institutional apparatus has been adapted to focus more on the 
thematic of mitigating the effects of desertification, the direct action in the most 
susceptible areas will hopefully, in the near future, bring relief to the areas most in peril. 
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2.2 Climate change 
 
Estamos vivendo um tempo We are living in times 
De um problema universal  Of a universal problem 
Denominado por todos  Called by everyone 
De aquecimento global.  Global warming.  
Ele age devagar,  It acts slowly 
Mas chega pra transformer But comes to transform 
Nosso sonho em pesadelo.  Our dream in a nightmare. 
Pelos fatos que passamos  By the facts that we know 
É certo que precisamos  It is true that we need 
Fazer por onde não tê-lo.  To do something to save us. 
-Felipe Júnior: “Os efeitos do aquecimento global”. 
 
2.2.1 General definition and future projections 
 
There is a lot of controversy and disagreement regarding the definition of climate 
change, and especially its potential future outcomes. Some even question the entire 
phenomenon, and others debate the question of whether what we call climate change is 
a natural development or result of human action. In this study, I have decided to use the 
definition and predictions of IPCC, The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 
The IPCC defines climate change as follows:  
A statistically significant variation in the mean state of the climate or its variability, 
persisting for an extended period (typically decades or longer). Climate change, as 
defined here, may be caused by natural internal processes or external forcings or by 
persistent anthropogenic changes in the composition of the atmosphere or land use.  
(IPCC 2001). 
 
According to the IPCC 4th Assessment Report from 2007, expressed as a global average, 
surface temperatures rose by about 0.74°C between 1906 and 2005. However, this 
warming was not steady, and had wide regional and seasonal variation. Particularly 
since the 1970s, warming has generally been greater over land than over the oceans. 
Seasonally, warming has been slightly greater in the winter hemisphere. (IPCC 2007). 
The recent warming period began in 1976, and it is estimated that world temperatures 
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could rise by between 1.1 and 6.4 °C during the 21st century. The best estimate for the 
low scenario is 1.8°C (likely range is 1.1°Cto 2.9°C), and the best estimate for the high 
scenario is 4.0°C (likely range is 2.4°C to 6.4°C). (IPCC 2007). 
As one outcome of these projected changes in temperature, the IPCC predicts changes 
in precipitation patterns. In a warmer future climate, it is projected that there will be 
increased summer dryness and winter wetness. Summer dryness indicates a greater risk 
of drought. Along with the risk of droughts, there is an increased chance of intense 
heavy rains and flooding due to the greater water-holding capacity of a warmer 
atmosphere. This has already been observed, and is a trend that is expected to continue 
because as temperatures rise, rainfall tends to be concentrated into more intense events, 
with longer periods of little precipitation in between. Therefore, intense and heavy rains 
would be interspersed with longer relatively dry periods. Another aspect of these future 
changes is that wet extremes are expected to become more severe in areas where mean 
precipitation is expected to increase, and dry extremes are projected to become more 
severe in areas where mean precipitation is projected to decrease. (IPCC 2007).  
Alongside these changes in rainfall, another trend in drought-stricken regions is the 
accompanying phenomenon of desertification, resulting more from human activities 
than from natural processes. Desertification is a worldwide phenomenon affecting about 
40 % of the Earth’s land mass. 70% of all dry areas suffer from desertification, 
accounting for 36 million km2. The least developed countries are the hardest hit by 
desertification, and over one billion people in over 100 countries are directly affected by 
desertification, or are at risk. (UNCCD 2003). Desertification occurs because drylands 
are extremely vulnerable to over-exploitation and inappropriate land use (eg. 
deforestation, overgrazing, and bad irrigation practices). The main projected outcomes 
of desertification include increased poverty, loss of land productivity, loss of 
biodiversity, and internal and/or cross-border migrations of people. (World Bank 2011). 
Desertification is also considered as a factor in the loss of sustainability, efficiency and 
equity in resource allocation, and in the intergenerational distribution of well-being. 
(CEPAL 2005, 23). 
As seen regarding desertification above, it is important not to forget the socioeconomic 
impacts of climate change. These include the costs of damages and the costs of 
adaptation, as well as benefits in certain areas where for example increases in 
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precipitation may increase agricultural yields. According to the IPCC, climate change is 
expected to have impact on several socioeconomic factors, including freshwater 
resources and their management, food, fiber and forest products, industry, settlement 
and society, and human health. Concerning freshwater resources, a frightening trend in 
vast areas of the globe is water stress, related to lack of access to freshwater resources. 
With respect to water supply, it is very likely that the costs of climate change will 
outweigh the benefits. One reason is that precipitation variability is very likely to 
increase. The impacts of floods and droughts could be mitigated by appropriate 
developments in infrastructure, and by transformations in water and land-use 
management, but all of these obviously entail costs. (IPCC 2007). 
In addition to uncertainties about the impacts of future climate change on freshwater 
systems, there are several other factors, including demographic, societal, and economic 
developments that need to be considered when evaluating the costs of climate change. 
Costs and benefits of climate change may take several forms, including increases or 
decreases in monetary costs, and human and ecosystem impacts. An example of this is 
the displacement of households due to flooding and droughts.  In addition to these 
displacements, in 2001 the IPCC warned of extensive migratory movements that could 
have serious political and social consequences:  
Human populations show significant tendencies to adapt to interannual variability of 
climate via migration, although migration may be the last of a complex set of coping 
strategies. […] A school of thought based on observations of several ethnic conflicts in 
the developing world suggests that environmental degradation, loss of access to 
resources, and resulting human migration (including ‘environmental refugees’) in some 
circumstances could become a source of political and even military conflict. (IPCC 
2001). 
 
2.2.2 Climate change in Latin America  
 
Regionally viewed, the IPCC predicts that all of Central and South America is very 
likely to warm during this century. The annual mean warming is predicted to be similar 
to the global mean warming in southern South America but larger than the global mean 
warming in the rest of the region. Regarding precipitation, rainfall is expected to 
increase in Ecuador and northern Peru, and to decrease at the northern tip of the 
continent and especially in southern northeast Brazil. (IPCC 2001). 
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What has the biggest effects on climate variability in the region is ENSO (El Niño- 
Southern Oscillation), a complex interaction of the Pacific Ocean and the global 
atmosphere, resulting in changed rainfall patterns, floods and droughts (Matallo Junior 
2009, 129-130). The region is vulnerable to El Niño, with varying impacts across the 
continent. El Niño, the warm oceanic phase, is associated with dry conditions in 
northeast Brazil, northern Amazonia, the Peruvian-Bolivian Altiplano, and the Pacific 
coast of Central America. In Mexico for example, the most severe droughts in recent 
decades have occurred during El Niño years, whereas southern Brazil and northwestern 
Peru have undergone unusually wet conditions. La Niña, El Niño’s cool phase 
counterpart, is associated with heavy rainfall and flooding in Colombia and drought in 
southern Brazil. If El Niño or La Niña were to increase, Latin America would be 
exposed to these conditions more often. (IPCC 2001). 
One of the most worrying impacts that these phenomena are projected to have is on 
agriculture. Agriculture remains a key sector in the regional economy, employing 30-
40% of the economically active population on the continent. It also is crucial for the 
food security of the poorest sectors of the population. Studies based on GCMs (General 
Circulation Models) and crop models project diminishing yields for numerous important 
crops such as maize, wheat, barley and grapes. Increases in temperature are predicted to 
reduce crops yields in the region by shortening the crop cycle, thereby severely 
threatening subsistence farming in some parts of Latin America, including northeastern 
Brazil. (IPCC 2001). Threats to subsistence farming could naturally, in their turn, 
aggravate the possibility of famines, and lead to at least temporary migratory 
movement. 
 
2.2.3 Climate change in Brazil  
 
Mainly as a result of increased CO2 concentrations, potential effects of climate change 
in Brazil suggest changes of up to 4-4.5°C in surface temperature for the year 2100. (De 
Siqueira et al 1994; 1999 ref. IPCC 2001). This places Brazil at the high end of even the 
highest projected scenario mentioned earlier. Brazil’s fragile, biologically diverse 
ecosystems make it especially vulnerable to climate change. The tropical rain forest in 
the Amazon, the Pantanal wetland, and the semi-arid region of Northeast Brazil are of 
41 
 
particular concern. According to some studies, the rise in temperatures could lead to the 
Amazon rain forest becoming dryer, making spontaneous fires more frequent. These 
fires would release additional greenhouse gases, increasing their concentrations in the 
atmosphere, which in turn would raise temperatures further. Changes in rainfall 
patterns, especially in the drought-affected Northeastern region of the country, could 
lead to the impoverishment of water resources and a reduced water supply. The effect 
on agriculture could be devastating, putting food production in jeopardy. How exactly 
climate change will affect agricultural productivity is not yet understood in full detail, 
but possible effects on crops that are particularly important to the country's economy, 
including corn, soybean, wheat, coffee and oranges, are a great concern. Especially in 
the sertão, subsistence farming and food security are already at the moment a big 
concern, and could be jeopardized further, leading to the risk of periodic famines in 
unirrigated areas. 
Decreased rainfall would also gravely affect the hydropower supply, which, according 
to the International Energy Association, provides more than 80% of the electricity 
Brazil generates. Destructive floods, which are already a serious problem for various 
regions, have in recent years been on the increase. Coastal areas are vulnerable to rising 
sea levels, affecting a great number of the population and economic activities. Finally, 
rising temperatures are expected to have consequences on human health, through the 
increased quantity of organisms that act as vectors for diseases, such as mosquitoes, 
which transmit dengue fever and malaria, and assassin bugs, which transmit Chagas 
disease. (La Rovere & Santos Pereira 2007).  In the sertão prone to droughts, dry 
extremes will affect the quantity and quality of water available for sanitary and drinking 
purposes, which can trigger cholera and diarrheal outbreaks. (IPCC 2001). 
In sum, Northeast Brazil is vulnerable to three main tendencies in different zones of the 
region. In the coastal areas the rise of average temperatures is already leading to a rise 
in sea levels. In the entire region, changing rainfall patterns related to El Niño y La Niña 
have lead to strong periodic droughts followed by unusually strong rains leading to 
destructive floods in several states of the region in the past years. In the interior 
hinterlands of the region, the combined effects of the rise of temperature, prolonged 
droughts and the unsustainable use of land (use of agrotoxins, slash-and-burn 
agriculture, deforestation etc.) has lead to vast areas being in danger or already in the 
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process of desertification. As mentioned earlier, in the state of Pernambuco 90% of the 
area is considered susceptible to desertification. 
The reason I present the above review on the technical and scientific projections on the 
impacts and scope of climate change is that it shows not only the severity of the 
objective evaluations for the future, but also influences lay opinions on the subject. 
Obviously, these differ somewhat in their expression, and, on some points, in their 
experience, but as will later on be seen, the power of scientific “fact” is surprisingly 
strong in guiding popular opinion as well. Next, I turn to local perceptions of climate 
change gathered on the field. 
 
2.2.4 Local perceptions of climate change 
 
What surprised me during the interviews and my observations was that regarding the 
present situation and projected future outcomes of climate change, the informants’ 
thoughts on the matter were surprisingly unanimous. A free listing exercise (Bernard 
2006, 301-305) conducted with 8 of the informants interviewed, revealed several 
overlaps in the respondents’ answers when asked to associate the first words coming to 
their mind related to the concept of climate change. 50% of the respondents mentioned 
“hunger” among the top 10 consequences, followed by “desertification”, “drought” and 
“violence”, in recurring order. Other expected consequences mentioned several times 
were “death” and “education/awareness building”. (Interviews Recife, PE, 12.08.2010; 
23.08.2010; 31.08.2010; 13.09.2010; 17.09.2010; 20.09.2010; 21.09.2010). 
There was, however, variation between what were seen as the causes of climate change, 
and how the effects should be mitigated, depending on where the informants were from. 
Those from Recife and the coast mentioned littering, and pollution from industry and 
cars as the main evils causing global warming. The expected effect most cited was a rise 
in sea levels, that in the future according to many could cause problems especially for 
slum dwellers living next to the sea and lacking in sanitation and sewage systems. I 
attended an activity with local Greenpeace activists in Olinda, a small city next to 
Recife, where they were cleaning the beach from waste, and it was intriguing to note 
that when these activists were chatting with sunbathers, they often mentioned climate 
change when trying to persuade people to collect their trash and recycle. Inland in the 
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sertão, however, the most cited elements causing climate change were deforestation and 
the use of agrotoxins by large companies, that according to my informants pollutes the 
atmosphere. The expected results were desertification, salinization of the soil, air 
pollution and lack of water resources. When asked what should be done to combat 
climate change, almost uniformly the answer in the sertão was agro-ecological farming, 
which according to the informants both curbs the use of agrotoxins and leads to less 
deforestation, as the land is used more efficiently, with more crops with different 
growth cycles being planted on the same plot of terrain.  
Below I present some excerpts from interviews conducted both in Recife and the sertão 
that shed light on how my informants have experienced climate change in their own 
lives, and what they expect from the future.  
Felipe, working in Recife but originally from the interior town of Petrolina in the 
Pernambucan sertão: 
R22: What do you think, in which way can you see them [changes] already?  
F: More specifically? Um, I think that the change in seasons, there it doesn t´ rain 
anymore, because of climate change, understand, and it will rain even less, or when it 
rains it rains a lot more, like that.  
R: Right, so droughts and floods? 
F: Droughts and floods, exactly… There... have been these prolonged droughts, a lot 
nastier, and when it rains that also floods everything. I think there that is the main thing. 
And there is going to be more of it. And this thing of desertification as well, that you will 
see already, just observe and you’ll see it already, it really is… (Interview Recife, PE, 
20.09.2010). 
 
María, working at FIOCRUZ Recife: 
The future will not be very different from the present. In the sense that… the big players, 
they have resources, instruments, all sorts of capital, right, talent, economic capital, 
financial capital, in order to resolve these problems. Developing countries will follow, 
Brazil dealing with how the country was structured, especially the cities, the urbanization 
process was without planning. It is a frantic development that we are talking about, and 
that has already caused serious problems, also environmental ones. It is about delaying 
the problem. Ten years from now it will be worse, because what is happening is 
completely untypical, the world is already... The environment, nature has already 
reorganized itself. Human nature as well, our whole living environment… So the future is 
somewhat frightening, if we do not act now, TODAY… But on the other hand I think that 
there is movement, on behalf of the new generations, children, for the earlier generations 
everything was a culture of wasting, a culture of the “unlimited” if you will. […] As a 
matter of fact, that conscience is already there... People already feel the changes in their 
                                                             
22 Riikka, referring to myself. 
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everyday life: ‘Oh, it´s hotter’; ‘oh, it´s raining in September, it´s irregular’, ‘oh, the sea-
level is rising’, ‘oh, there´s no clean drinking water’ ‘oh, our health is deteriorating’, ‘oh, 
the dengue is here…’ So, it is felt, but the question is what to do? (Interview Recife, PE, 
21.09.2010). 
 
Mateo, member of a communal farmers’ organization in the municipality of Cacimbas, 
Paraíba: 
I think one important thing to mention here is, that from 1993 till now, when it began… 
or when we started to notice this question of climate change here… if you talk with the 
farmers, they tend to have the following discourse: “look, agriculture is not worthwhile 
anymore.” And when they say agriculture, they mean subsistence farming, like maize, 
beans, on that no one lives nowadays in the countryside, producing only those. And that 
is due to the climate change, right, the irregularity of rains, the rise in temperatures, all 
that makes production fall every year more and more, right? It has also influenced the 
fertility of the soil. And that woke them up, the farmers, to have a vision of developing 
production more extensively, right? Because before they only planted maize, beans and 
broad beans. Nowadays, they also plant maize, beans and broad beans, but they try to 
have a more systemic view of how to use their property, by diversifying, by having 
variety. (Interview Cacimbas, PB, 14.10.2010). 
 
Gilson and Raquel, CPT representatives from Cajazeiras: 
There are some areas, around here, where the land has become useless due to the ways 
the land has been used. The soil has become too poor for farming, because of salinization 
resulting from these irrigation schemes and toxins. (Interview Cajazeiras, PB, 
11.10.2010). 
 
A survey titled “Climate Change and Poverty: How Local Communities see the 
Problem”, conducted by the Brazilian Forum on Climate Change in 2009 organized by 
COEP (Committee of Entities Against Hunger and For Life), came up with similar 
results concerning local perceptions of climate change. Of the respondents, 74% live in 
the Northeastern semi-arid region, and therefore the results of the survey are 
comparable with those I gathered in my encounters with the informants. Both rural and 
urban communities were consulted, but there were no considerable differences in their 
responses to the questions I highlight here. According to the study, 94% of the people 
interviewed believe that the climate has been changing through the years, and 87% of 
the respondents believe that climate change is already affecting them. When asked what 
has changed, the three most common answers were “higher temperatures”, “variations 
in rainfall”, and “variations in water levels in rivers”. Thus, most of the results obtained 
through the survey point to the same general direction as the answers I got on the field. 
However, a point in the survey I found very interesting, and which will be discussed 
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more later on in this study, is the question of responsibility and accountability. In the 
following figure are the results obtained in the survey regarding responsibility for 
addressing problems resulting from climate change: 
 
  Source: COEP, Brazilian Forum on Climate Change, 2009. 
What can be gathered from both the survey, and the testimonies I collected is that there 
seems to be a consensus that climate change is actually happening, it is already being 
felt, and the trend is expected to grow in the future. Reflecting the projections by the 
IPCC, its most notable manifestations were also mentioned by my informants to be 
irregular rains and the rise in temperature, both of which were felt to affect agricultural 
yields at the present time and in the future. Diversifying production and using less 
toxins were also seen as solutions for mitigating the effects. As will be seen later on, a 
moral dimension was also strongly linked to this argument of agro-ecological family 
farming, as it not only is perceived to promote sustainability of the environment, but 
also to challenge power structures and promote social equality. This point will be 
elaborated on in more detail in the fourth chapter, but suffice it to note here that almost 
invariably in the countryside, mentioning climate change lead to discussions about agro-
ecological farming and problems related to land use.  
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3 THEORY 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, poverty can be conceptualized and analyzed from a 
number of different perspectives. I have chosen to focus on poverty not as mere material 
lack, but on the structural, historical and cultural forces behind it. Therefore I will 
proceed in this chapter from poverty seen as structural violence to a theory of global 
risk society, linking structure to the postmodern era, and will finally complement these 
two theoretical frames with ideas of forms of resistance used to the poor to combat and 
criticize their situation. 
 
3.1   Structural violence 
 
To summarize, the term ‘structural violence’ originates from peace researcher Johan 
Galtung, who defined it as “violence which corresponds with the systematic ways in 
which a given social structure or social institution kills people slowly by preventing 
them from meeting their basic needs.”  (Galtung 1996, 200). Structural violence is, 
according to Galtung, deeply embedded in social institutions, and repeated through 
everyday action once the structure has been formed. It is the avoidable impairment of 
fundamental human needs, which lowers the individuals’ potential of leading a 
fulfilling life. This type of violence manifests itself as inequality in the division of 
resources, the access to political power, in education, health care and legal position, to 
name a few. (Farmer et al 2006). According to Galtung, the archetypal violent structure 
has exploitation as its centre-piece, meaning that the ‘topdogs’ get much more out of the 
interaction within the structure than the ‘underdogs’. The violent structure leaves its 
mark not only on the human body, but also on the mind and the spirit. There are four 
reinforcing components in a violent structure, that support exploitation: penetration, 
which implants the topdog into the life of the underdog; segmentation, providing the 
underdog with only a very partial view of what goes on; marginalization, in other words 
keeping the underdog on the outside, and fragmentation, keeping the underdogs away 
from each other. All these components work together, in Galtung’s view, to impede 
consciousness formation and mobilization within the ranks of the underdogs. (Galtung 
1990, 294).  
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Another important feature of structural violence is its relation to direct violence: 
“Violence breedes violence”, as Galtung puts it. Structural violence is needs-
deprivation, to which one potential reaction is direct violence. However, Galtung notes 
that structural violence can also lead to “a feeling of hopelessness, a deprivation/ 
frustration syndrome that shows up on the inside as self-directed aggression and on the 
outside as apathy and withdrawal”. Of the potential outcomes of structural violence, 
Galtung argues that obviously, given the choice between a violent mass and an apathetic 
society, topdogs tend to prefer the latter, choosing governability over anarchy. (Galtung 
1990, 295). This conceptualization of the potential outcome of structural violence bears 
strong resemblance to Oscar Lewis’ theory of a ‘culture of poverty’.  Lewis’ contested 
and often criticized argument goes that among the poor there exists a particular 
subculture, that is perpetuated from generation to generation and leads to a feeling of 
marginalization, helplessness and inferiority. According to Lewis, the people living in a 
culture of poverty are have very little sense of history, “know only their own troubles, 
their own local conditions, their own neighborhood, their own way of life.” They thus 
generally do not participate actively in community life and take little or no political 
initiative. (Lewis in ed. Guillemin 1981, 317).  
It must be noted, however, that Lewis’ theory received strong critique already as far 
back as the 1960s, mainly due to its assumptions that the poor form a ‘subculture’ 
somewhat separate from the rest of society, and that the “traits of the poor are the cause 
of the traits of the poor”: that is, the theory confused the causal and descriptive 
conceptions of poverty. (Roach & Gursslin 1967, 392). The reason I have mentioned 
Lewis’ theory in this work is to critique Galtung in this sense, as I see a strong 
resemblance between the two arguments that both victimize the poor without 
questioning this hypothesis. The strenght of Galtung’s theory of structural violence is 
that it highlights the systematic, institutional and intergenerational aspects of poverty. 
Poverty and misery do not arise from thin air, cannot be blamed on the poor themselves, 
and tend to repeat themselves from one generation to another. Galtung also manages to 
separate the definition of poverty from purely materialistic viewpoints by not focusing 
on the lack of material needs but the fulfillment of potentials. However, the weakness in 
Galtung’s conceptualization lies in his theory remaining at a very abstract level, and 
almost completely ignoring the question of accountability.  
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Paul Farmer (2005) took Galtung’s theory a step further and linked it to the question of 
human rights – his argument being that certain basic human rights, such as the right to 
health care, are seriously violated by lack of access to them arising from the structures 
of society. This is an interesting move since traditionally human rights violations have 
been attributed to a recognisable perpetrator – be it the government, a terrorist group or 
an individual, there is always someone to blame and someone responsible. To call 
structural violence a human rights violation thus implies that there are real flesh and 
blood people behind policy decisions leading to misery, and institutions, as natural and 
incontestable as they seem, can be changed in the course of time. Why does finding the 
responsible matter? Because taken from the human rights point of view, it has important 
implications for legislation. The international human rights legislation is still very much 
focused on getting someone on trial – when misery is attributed to ’the way things are’, 
this is obviously impossible. To take the passing of national laws for example, it is 
much harder to pass a discriminatory law if in the face of the international human rights 
code this violates some basic principles. I will return to the question of accountability in 
the next subchapter in the discussion on the theory of risk society. 
To return to Farmer, in his book Pathologies of Power: Health, Human Rights and the 
New War on the Poor, he views the problem of structural violence especially from the 
perspective of inequality of health, and focuses on how the structures of a given society 
are an important factor behind the rise of epidemics.  As examples Farmer points to the 
spread of HIV/AIDS in Haiti and the tuberculosis epidemic in Russian prisons. Another 
leading thought in his work is discovering the links between structural violence and 
political and economic change. According to him, the dominant neoliberal economic 
policy has created a situation where medical knowhow and care has become a 
commodity, and where the system is ruled by the laws of free market. This view of 
medicine-as-commerce arises, according to Farmer, from the dominant economic 
regime, and it increases social injustice by eliminating the safety networks previously 
managed by the state from the weakest and most marginalized groups in society. 
(Farmer 2005, 161-164). His main line of thought can be summed up as follows: 
“Suffering is ’structured’ by historically given (and often economically driven) 
processes and forces that conspire – whether through routine, ritual, or, as is more 
commonly the case, the hard surfaces of life – to constrain agency” (Farmer 2005, 40).  
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In other words, the range of opportunities is more closed and human agency more 
constrained for the disfavored than for the privileged members of a given society. This 
has, according to Farmer, direct implications for human rights issues – as states weaken, 
the role of nongovernmental institutions and private businesses increases, but “it is also 
easy to discern a trap: the withdrawal of states from the basic business of providing 
services usually means further erosion of the social and economic rights of the poor” 
(Farmer 2005, 244). Although Farmer focuses on health, I think it is interesting to see if 
the theory can be extended to analyze environmental hazards as well. The growing trend 
of linking environmental rights with human rights also has brought the discussion of 
rights to the climate change discourse, and as the general belief is that the poor and 
marginalized will also be the first to suffer from the effects of climate change, I think 
linking these theoretical discussions is rather logical.  
What makes Farmer’s argument rather leftist is the fact that he mainly puts the 
responsibility on a competition-driven market economy and the neoliberal policies 
directed at developing countries by actors such as World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund. He also sees the role of states and governments in ensuring human 
rights for their citizens as critical – something that can of course, be seen as a call for 
strong state intervention in economic and political issues, and that can definitely be 
contested. So, the analytical concept of structural violence is, undoubtedly, problematic, 
as shall also be seen further on: it can definitely be blamed for explaining ‘nothing and 
everything’, and for taking the focus away from the individual action of the subjects 
themselves. It has been accused of putting all the responsibility on the state, and of 
having a rather uncomfortable leftist tone to it. However, it does in my opinion avoid 
some of the traditional pitfalls of conceptualizing development and poverty, such as 
taking poverty as a status quo that ‘just happens’, that is not the result of underlying 
structures, or worse, the blaming of people themselves for their poverty. The strength of 
the argument, to my mind, lies not in blaming Western imperialism for the suffering of 
the Third World poor, but in the fact that calling a form of poverty ‘violence’ and 
linking it to human rights implies that someone somewhere is responsible, and that there 
is a chance of influencing policy instead of seeing poverty as a force that sweeps the 
Third World due to accident or worse, due to its own inability to rise out of it. It is a 
moral stand. 
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To my mind, the term could be useful in actually avoiding the trendy argument of 
poverty being a result of Western imperialism, if it were to attribute the reasons not only 
to foreign influences but to local structures that may very well arise from the local 
cultural context. I think the problem is that the term is not one originating from 
anthropology, but peace research, and has not been widely applied to different contexts 
in anthropology. Even in the works of scholars such as Farmer, the term undoubtedly 
retains its tone of blaming the current global economic regime as the root cause of 
poverty and misery. I still cannot help but wonder what would happen if the definition 
were extended to include the local cultural framework and its pitfalls as well – at this 
point I would not blame the term, but rather its narrow applications. Its strength as an 
analytical concept in the discourse on poverty can, in my opinion, be attributed to the 
fact that it goes beyond describing what is obvious to ‘the naked eye’, and forces us as 
social scientists to focus on the invisible forces and structures at work behind the 
phenomenon of poverty. 
 
3.2 Risk society in the era of ecological hazards  
 
As noted earlier, one of the weaknesses of the concept of structural violence lies in the 
fact that it is relatively bound to critique of the state as a political actor. It often 
presupposes institutions under control or within the sphere of influence of the nation-
state, which is a problematic starting point in the postmodern era of globalism where the 
states’ role has at least changed, if not diminished. Also placing the focus on social 
structure draws attention away from individual responsibility, action and resistance. 
This is why I have decided to supplement the theory of structural violence with notions 
of the risk society and later on, with James Scott’s theory of peasant resistance, placing 
the problematic of climate change and postmodern hazards in a theoretical context I feel 
is more suited to the era of globalization and post-industrial society. Ulrich Beck 
manages to raise interesting questions regarding ecological hazards as invisible threats 
and projections in the sphere of the unknown, the near future,  and a now where power-
relations are redefined by the emergence of new powerful actors such as the scientific 
community, the civil society and multinational companies. The fact that ecological 
hazards, including climate change, redefine the roles of those potentially held 
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accountable and have an impact on the lives of practically all actors involved with 
disregard to state boundaries and social class, and extend to an unforeseeable future, 
calls for a theory that takes these factors into consideration.  
Beck’s theoretical framework consists of three inter-related components: risk, 
individualization, and reflexive modernization. He points to a dynamic that is driven by 
an increase in global risks and in the ability of science to detect increasingly invisible 
risks, leading to a complete re-ordering of social positions in society, and to a 
transformation in the cultural meanings of risk. Beck argues that what differentiates the 
contemporary era from its past are new categories of risk that, unlike in the past, are no 
longer circumscribed spatially or temporarily. The risks of nuclear radiation, modern 
technologies, greater mobility of diseases, global warming, invasive species and many 
other challenges expose virtually all people around the globe to common risks. By 
reflexive modernization Beck means that while threats have been faced and confronted 
throughout human history,  
society today is confronted by itself through its dealings with risks. Risks are the 
reflection of human actions and omissions, the expression of highly developed productive 
forces. That means that the sources of danger are no longer ignorance but knowledge; not 
a deficient but a perfected mastery over nature; not that which eludes the human grasp but 
the system of norms and objective constraints established with the industrial epoch. (Beck 
1992, 183). 
 
What further separates the postmodern era from the early days of modernization is that 
the social order during the latter was centered on economics, especially the distribution 
of economic output. This distribution was directly tied to social class, with those at the 
top getting more and those at the bottom getting less. This ordering echoes Galtung’s 
and Farmer’s theory of structural violence as well, with the ‘topdogs’ oppressing the 
‘underdogs’. In Beck’s opinion, this order of things has been turned upside down in the 
present era. (Rosa 2006).  While the earlier social ordering according to economics 
centered on the distribution of wealth in a stratified and class-specific pattern, there is 
now a systematic difference in the type, media and pattern for the distribution of risks. 
This does not, according to Beck, mean that risks are not often distributed in a stratified 
way, or that social class does not matter. Poverty still attracts an unfortunate abundance 
of risks, whereas the wealthy (in income, power or education) have the opportunity to 
purchase safety and freedom from risk. (Beck 1992, 35). However, what happens with 
the expansion of modernization risks, such as the endangering of nature, health, 
nutrition, and so on, is that the social differences and limits are relativized. There is a 
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controversial dynamic at play: on the one hand, like wealth, risks adhere to the class 
pattern, only inversely, with wealth accumulating at the top, risks at the bottom. (Beck 
1992, 35).   To that extent, risks seem to strengthen, not to abolish, the class society. On 
the other hand, risks display an equalizing effect within their scope and among those 
affected by them.  “Reduced to a formula: poverty is hierarchic, smog is democratic” 
(Beck 1992, 36). No one is automatically spared from phenomena such as global 
warming or nuclear threat. New social risk positions open up. Thus, risk societies are 
not exactly class societies; their risk positions cannot be understood as mere class 
positions, or their conflicts as solely class conflicts. (Beck 1992, 36). In the global risk 
society, knowledge as capital gains an important role: wealth can be possessed but one 
can only be afflicted by risks. Risks are, so to speak, ascribed by civilization. “Bluntly, 
one might say: in class and stratification positions, being determines consciousness, 
while in risk positions, consciousness determines being. Knowledge gains a new 
political significance.” (Beck 1992, 23). 
In his analysis of the risk society, Beck focuses mostly on the nuclear threat, toxins used 
in industry, and pollution. He does mention climate change a number of times, but at the 
time when he formed his main arguments (early and mid-nineties), the climate change 
discourse had not reached the same momentum it has now. So, it is important to ask, are 
Beck’s insights applicable to the discussion on climate change? In her article Governing 
climate change: the politics of risk society?  Harriet Bulkeley argues that several 
characteristics of climate change epitomize Beck´s definition of the experience of risk in 
postmodern risk society. First of all, the causes of climate change arise from modernity 
itself:  
Apparently innocuous and invisible gases, such as methane and carbon dioxide, released 
as by-products of development (the industrialization of agriculture, increased energy 
consumption and economic growth) change the composition of the atmosphere with 
untold consequences. This accords with Beck´s supposition that in risk society, risks arise 
not from a lack of modernity, as hazards associated with poverty and underdevelopment 
might be conceived, but rather as the side-effects of modernization. (Bulkeley 2001, 431-
432). 
 
I think this is an extremely important point in conceptualizing poverty in the post-
industrial era, closely linked also to the concept of structural violence: poverty is not to 
be defined as solely material needs deprivation, but as new forms of threats and 
limitations to well-being resulting from modernization itself. Climate change is a good 
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example of Beck’s argument that in the risk society, the concern shifts from the 
‘distribution of goods’ to issues surrounding the ‘distribution of bads’ (Beck 1992, 35). 
The earlier mentioned role of knowledge in the definition of risks cannot be 
underestimated. It is important to bear in mind that threats such as climate change, 
although more and more perceivable each day, remain largely invisible, and as such 
dependent on expert knowledge. Things such as income and education are consumable 
goods that can be experienced by the individual. However, the existence of, and the 
distribution of risks are “mediated on principle through argument. That which impairs 
health or destroys nature is not recognizable to one´s own feeling or eye, and even 
where it is seemingly in plain view, qualified expert judgment is still required to 
determine it ‘objectively’.” (Beck 1992, 27). This leads us to consider the power of 
science. In risk society, science becomes the principal institution for defining, 
identifying, and analyzing risks. However, through its engagement in the traditional role 
of generating new discoveries and new technologies, science inevitably also adds to 
existing risks. Science thus becomes a double-edged sword: it not only defines and 
seeks solutions to risks, but also partakes in their creation. (Rosa 2006). What is also 
often forgotten is the fallibility of science, and its dependence on decisions, 
methodology, and context. Different studies portray a different reality, and different 
projections of the future. Beck declares that “technology and natural science have 
become one economic enterprise on a large industrial scale, without truth or 
enlightenment, comparable to the secular power of the Medieval church without God.” 
(Beck 1995, 119). However, as knowledge becomes power, science is needed to 
legitimate action, be it in the political sphere or in the actions of the civil society. For 
example in the case of climate change, action depends on how the threat is defined, who 
are seen as the players in the game, and what the future is projected to be like. 
Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky (1983) also take up the subject of the relativity of 
risks in their book Risk and Culture. Their main argument is that risks are always 
socially defined, and different social settings affect what risks are perceived most 
threatening and receive the most attention in a given society. Unlike Beck however, 
who focuses on the power of modern Western science in the definition and mitigation of 
risks, Douglas and Wildavsky conceptualize the theme on a larger scale. The definition 
and ranking of risks reflects the way a society is institutionalized, and is not merely the 
result of the power of a technocratic, scientific approach. The authors recognize three 
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institutional types which partake in public decision-making: two that uphold the central 
power, these being market and hierarchy, and one representing the border, referred to as 
sect. All three provide a theory of how society should be organized and an explanatory 
philosophy to justify the lifestyle chosen. (Douglas & Wildavsky 1983, 175). In 
environmental affairs, the most prominent and outspoken of these three institutional 
types is the sect, encompassing the civil society, environmentalists, etc. The sect works 
on an egalitarian principle, is diffuse in its organization, has no hierarchical structure 
and minimum bureaucracy. Its very form makes it therefore fit to deal with and 
highlight global issues, not local ones:   
Sects need to speak on behalf of the whole of mankind, not for a few millions. Physical 
nature is their best substitute for God, not only because nature is powerful and 
unpredictable. The bias against elaborate institutional forms makes nature the appropriate 
good counterpart to defend against bad central society. (Douglas & Wildavsky 1983, 
125).  
 
Sects also have several characteristics in common that make them apt for voicing out 
critical thoughts against the actions of the market and state – they regenerate moral 
fervor, they portray their agenda as a counteraction against a “global conspiracy of 
evil”, they prefer small-scale organization and their values are opposed to big industry, 
big organization, and big technology. (Douglas & Wildavsky 1983, 139). 
The civil society’s important role in voicing out environmental concerns has been 
established above. But what makes environmental hazards and climate change rank so 
high in the list of potential risks to human safety? Douglas and Wildavsky argue that in 
the postmodern era, pollution ideas are an instrument of control, and as such the 
question is strongly tied to the global political context. The role of the state has in recent 
times if not diminished, at least changed drastically in most countries: “when the central 
establishment is strong, it holds the monopoly of explaining the natural order.” 
(Douglas & Wildavsky 1983, 47). However, in a world where the capitalist market and 
the state are engaged in a constant competition, the central establishment weakens, 
opening up the stage for new actors to engage in global discourses. Nature, in both 
western and non-western societies, is not merely a subject for contemplation and 
curiosity, but is tightly linked to questions of power and prestige. Just as nature is not 
‘only nature’, environmentalism is not essentially an objective response to external 
threat, but rather one of the typical ways in which social groups bring to light internal 
tensions and concerns for social accountability. (Richards & Ruivenkamp 1996, 282).  
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 In the era of increased individualization, the voluntariness or involuntariness of risks 
also becomes an important point of debate. There are, on the one hand, risks that are 
individually chosen, and thus more acceptable to the individual, such as extreme sports 
or martyrdom, and on the other, risks that are involuntary, seen as unjust, and should 
from the citizens’ point of view be controlled by law. The boundary between voluntary 
and involuntary risks therefore leads to a moral judgment of who is to be held 
accountable. (Douglas & Wildavsky 1983, 20).  Collective, involuntary risks tend to 
rise to the forefront irrespective of culture or time due to this moral evaluation. “To 
pretend that there are no moral judgments involved in recognizing which are the most 
threatening dangers is equivalent to the tribal consensus that attributes a punitive moral 
regard to the seasons and stars.” (Douglas & Wildavsky 1983, 30). Of course, each 
culture and era has its own ideas of what is normal or natural: if child death, disease or 
the incidence of accidents is held to be normal, no one is blamed. This idea of 
normality, however, naturally changes with new knowledge, and since in the 
postmodern societies science is mainly responsible for creating that knowledge, it has a 
distinctive role also in the definition of risks. (Douglas & Wildavsky 1983, 35). Also 
novel technologies are essential elements within social discourse and practice. They 
emerge from institutional settings, and serve as a subject for intergroup contestation. 
The language of technological change is also a moral discourse, as different social 
groups view the future in different ways. (Richards & Ruivenkamp 1996, 275).  
The power of knowledge and yearning for scientific ‘facts’ was extremely interesting to 
note on the field in Northeast Brazil as well. Pamphlets and educational material 
explaining climate change to farmers and peasants abound, and one of the main worries 
expressed by experts and NGO workers regarding climate change and the future was 
precisely lack of knowledge. Contextualized education, and providing ‘facts’ 
legitimized by expert institutions such as the IPCC among others, were seen as 
indispensable ways to combat problems such as desertification and potential future 
water stress. Added to this, most of the solutions brought forth by the NGOs working on 
the problem of drought on site involved technological innovations – differing from 
large-scale infrastructural projects of the government, true, but nevertheless 
technological solutions, be they cisterns, rock tanks, or other cost-effective ways to 
capture rainwater. The diffusion of information by the media and by charity 
organizations and NGOs is definitely bearing fruit: I still find it amazing that in the 
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hinterlands of Northeast Brazil, where literacy rates remain low and many of my 
informants had never left their home region, practically everyone could explain to me 
what climate change was about, what causes it, and what is foreseen to happen in the 
future in rather technical-scientific terms.  
Another central point in the politics of risk society is so called conflicts of 
accountability, in other words how the consequences of risk can be controlled and 
mitigated. The novel conceptualization of threats and hazards leads to consider political 
questions. In the postmodern risk society, the political institutions of modernity are 
irrelevant, inadequate and impotent. Decision-making power, control and legitimacy 
increasingly locate outside the political sphere, and find root in economic, 
technological, and scientific communities and consumption sites. (Bulkeley 2001, 431-
432). Thus, there are three key aspects concerning the political possibilities of 
contemporary risk: first, that the politics of risk society are not conducted primarily 
through the centralized formal political system; second, that in risk society, the formal 
political system is weakened; and third, that it is within ‘subpolitics’ that conflicts of 
accountability will be resolved or ignored. ‘Subpolitics’ refers to new concentrations of 
power, such as economic, technocratic and scientific circles, that have become key 
players in the contemporary era. (Bulkeley 2001, 434). 
What does this mean for the role of the state? A new movement is launched, which runs 
counter to the accomplishments of the welfare state project in the first two-thirds of the 
past century. Whereas politics then acquired the power potentials of the ‘interventionist 
state’,  
now the potential for structuring society migrates from the political system into the sub-
political system of scientific, technological and economic modernization. A precarious 
reversal of politics and non-politics occurs. The political becomes non-political and the 
non-political political.” (Beck 1992, 186).  
 
This leaves the state in an uncomfortable role: on the one hand, there remains a fixation 
on the formal political system as the exclusive center of politics; on the other, 
increasingly the state has limited intervention capacity in relation to modernization in 
industry and research. (Beck 1992, 187). Beck further highlights this paradox by 
commenting that  
the growing political power of hazard leads to a growing call for the state to take 
authoritarian measures, which defend its own authority while technical safety constructs 
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disintegrate. To the failure of engineers is added that of policy, law, science; investments 
turn into losses of billions and markets collapse. This domino effect forces the state into a 
kind of defensive aggression, in which some day perhaps even talking about hazards will 
be punishable.” (Beck 1995, 167). 
 
So, where does this leave the state? The opposing calls for an authoritarian, 
interventionist state and the reality of the state’s weakening role as the sole platform of 
political decision making would seem to lead to a situation that largely benefits 
industry. “In relation to the state, industry possesses a double advantage, that of the 
autonomy of investment decisions and the monopoly on the application of technology” 
(Beck 1992, 212). Whereas Farmer highlights the importance of the state in 
guaranteeing a level of well-being for its citizens and taking responsibility for their 
basic needs, Beck argues that the state may no longer be in the position to do so, at least 
not effectively. The problem lies in the relations between the state, industry, and 
science: science introduces innovations with a clear conscience, industry acts based on 
those innovations, but does not regulate, whereas the state tries to regulate something 
over which it has no real influence. These relations work under the cloak of ‘progress’ 
and ‘development’, which according to Beck is an institutionalization of social change 
into a position of organized non-responsibility: “The non-responsibility of science 
corresponds to the implicit responsibility of the businesses and the mere responsibility 
for legitimation of politics.” (Beck 1992, 214).  
The question of responsibility also relates to the principles of the legal system; in the 
eyes of the law, it is generally the individual that can be held accountable. Thus, what 
needs to be defined from a judicial point of view in order to prosecute, that is, lay 
responsibility on someone, is a cause-effect relation, for which a particular individual, 
or group of individuals, can be found guilty. This obviously does not accord with the 
nature of global environmental hazards. Once again, as with the theory of structural 
violence, we are faced with the dilemma of being able to define the problem, but not 
acting upon it. As Beck declares: “Everyone is cause and effect, and thus non-cause. 
The causes dribble away into a general amalgam of agents and conditions, reactions and 
counter-reactions, which brings social certainty and popularity to the concept of 
system.” (Beck 1992, 33). Institutions continue to work according to their old roles 
without a transformation suited to the risk society, leading to a situation where risks are 
‘normalized’ away. Regarding climate change, the fact that a single substance cannot be 
proved as the cause results in a situation where the international production of 
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substances aggravating the problem defies the culpability of a single company or 
perpetrator responsible. Thus the individual character of criminal law works in favor of 
collective non-responsibility. (Beck 1995, 131-132). 
So what is the collective result of this generalized non-responsibility? Beck suggests 
that among the ‘victims’, forced to live in closest contact with ecological hazards, the 
situation may lead to what he designates “the death-reflex of normality”, that is, a 
tendency not only to accept the risks, but to deny their existence completely and carry 
on as though they do not exist. (Beck 1995, 48). His argument goes that ecological 
protest does not begin with the poor; it is ignited among middle-income, educated folk. 
(Beck 1995, 54)- This assumption, as mentioned earlier, is repeated in both Galtung’s 
theory of the potential outcomes of structural violence, and Lewis’ theory of the ‘culture 
of poverty’. However, Beck offers a competing hypothesis, related to the generalization 
of hazards: that in the risk society, a possible outcome is also that of new alliances, and 
unification of victims. The global hazards of today, including climate change, may 
“contain within themselves a grass-roots developmental dynamics that destroys 
boundaries” (Beck 1992, 47). 
My observations on the field in Northeast Brazil suggest that there is considerable 
variety in the way the farmers and peasants react to the problems and threats posed by 
the current social structure and climate change. Among some there indeed existed a 
mood of resignation, and bitterness towards large multinational firms, the government, 
and other actors who were held responsible for the situation. I also heard second-hand 
reports of open resistance and even direct violence by those fighting for their rights to 
land and subsistence; these were mainly indigenous communities, and their clashes with 
large landowners tended to be somewhat sporadic and small-scale, loosely organized 
attempts at protest. A number of my informants did, however, expect a rise in rural 
violence related to problems caused by climate change, such as battles for water and 
arable land. As Beck suggests, there indeed also exists a trend to form new alliances, 
such as the one between church groups and environmental movements and the peasantry 
protesting mainly against actions of large agribusiness companies. However, there also 
seemed to be another form of resistance on the rise closely tied to the discourse on 
climate change, a moral stand defending agro-ecological farming and praising the 
environmental benefits of small, organic family farms. This use of moral ‘superiority’ in 
order to undermine the opponent has also been detected in other radical environmental 
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movements critiquing capitalism or multinational companies. (Lindholm 1998). I shall 
now turn to James Scott’s theory of everyday peasant resistance in order to complement 
the theories of structural violence and risk society with a view of innovative ways of 
fighting for the rights of the poor beyond direct violence and passive resignation.  
 
3.3 Weapons of the weak and resistance 
 
In his book Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance, James Scott 
observes the everyday covert forms of resistance used by Malaysian peasants in the 
1970s. By everyday peasant resistance Scott refers to the constant struggle between the 
peasants and those who attempt to extract labor, food, taxes, rents, and interest from 
them. One important trait of peasant resistance in Malaysia, as in many other Third 
World countries, is that it is rarely formally organized activity, the existing peasant 
organizations usually being the creations of state officials and rural elites. (Scott 1985, 
298). Since the green revolution, the region went through a number of structural 
changes, such as double-cropping and mechanization, which have produced a 
numerous, marginal, poor class of small farmers at the bottom of the heap, a well-off 
class of capitalist farmers at the top, and a significant middle peasantry in between. 
(Scott 1985, 71). These structural changes have resulted in new, everyday forms of 
oppression, paired with novel everyday forms of resistance. According to Scott, the 
ordinary weapons of relatively powerless groups consist not of overt protest, but of 
subtle forms of protest such as “foot dragging, dissimulation, desertion, false 
compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, sabotage, and so on” (Scott 1985, 
xvi). This style of resistance can be described by contrasting, paired forms of resistance: 
on the one hand, everyday resistance, on the other hand, open defiance.  An example of 
the former is the quiet process by which peasant squatters have often moved on 
plantation and state forest lands; of the latter a public invasion of land that openly 
challenges property relations. In terms of actual occupation and use, squatting may 
accomplish more than an openly defiant land invasion, even if the de jure distribution of 
property rights is in this case not publicly challenged. (Scott 1985, 32). 
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Another important feature of these more subtle forms of resistance is that they take 
place against a backdrop of moral and symbolic realms, although the benefits sought are 
more often than not material. 
Scott notes that in Sedaka, the village he studied, 
the struggle between rich and poor is not merely a struggle over work, property rights, 
grain, and cash. It is also a struggle over the appropriation of symbols, a struggle over 
how the past and present shall be understood and labeled, a struggle to identify causes 
and assess blame, a contentious effort to give partisan meaning to local history. (Scott 
1985, xvii).  
 
There are competing discourses at work:  the straightforward language of capitalist 
economic interests, profit maximization, accumulation and property rights, and the 
moral, tradition-tied discourse of the poor. This moral discourse of the poor forms 
something of a symbolic barrier to the cold capitalist logic, impeding the ethic 
legitimization of the practices of most well-off farmers in Sedaka. (Scott 1985, 234). 
What the poor peasants do is use the values and rationale of an earlier social order to 
press their claims and disparage the claims of their opponents. For example, they call 
the rich stingy and hardhearted whenever help in the form of charity is not given to 
them, and insist, albeit in vain, on their right to employment and to tenancies, which the 
large landowners claimed to bestow upon them out of a sense of helpfulness in the 
earlier social order.  
Thus, the critique and discontent is directed at the local dominant elite, not the state or 
the policies behind the novel form of capitalist agriculture. (Scott 1985, 336). There is a 
trend of personalization at work, mediating the experiences of capitalism, imperialism, 
and the green revolution. The peasants do not choose to emphasize the larger causes of 
their difficulties, but this does not mean that they are unaware of these. Their enemies 
are not impersonal forces, but real people. (Scott 1985, 348). They are members of the 
same community, which also inevitably leads to the fact that conflicts have to be dealt 
with in a way that does not lead to open war within the community. As Scott points out,  
no matter how conscious members of a subordinate class may be of having gotten a raw 
deal, the daily pressure of making a living and the risks of open defiance are usually 
enough to skew the ethnographic record systematically in the direction of compliance, if 
not acceptance, of the inevitable (Scott 1985, 324).  
Resignation to what seems inevitable may produce compliance, but this is not the same 
as according it legitimacy.  
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4 ANALYSIS 
 
4.1 Structural violence in the sertão of Northeast Brazil 
 
The aim of this subchapter is to prove that there indeed exists a situation that can be 
deemed structural violence in the hinterlands of Northeast Brazil, and to analyze the 
forms this violence takes. As has been noted earlier, all the institutions mentioned; the 
drought industry, land use questions already dating back to colonial times, the imagery 
of misery related to drought, government policies and nowadays increasingly, 
agribusiness, have played their part in creating and maintaining this construct. For 
centuries, as Galtung would put it, the ‘topdogs’ have been oppressing, benefiting from, 
and marginalizing the ‘underdogs’. The situation has historical roots, is still persistent, 
there are institutions in place that reiterate and reinforce the structure and impede a part 
of the population from living a full life through restricting access to water and land.  
And, as Farmer would probably have hoped, in recent times this structural violence has 
come to be seen not only as an institutional problem, but a question of human rights 
through the climate change discourse.  
 
4.1.1 The institutions behind inequality 
 
As mentioned in earlier chapters, droughts are often blamed for social marginalization 
in Northeast Brazil. However, they can explain rural poverty only partially. It is the 
combination of periodic droughts, the social structure, and political realities that is at the 
root of marginalization and poverty. Even in times of normal rains, the “meager 
resource reserves are barely enough to meet their subsistence needs.” (Arons 2004, 67; 
72).  As Scheper-Hughes notes, the region is still at a transitional stage of state 
formation, and home to many traditional and semi feudal structures, among these its 
legacy of local political bosses (coroneis) spawned by an agrarian latifundista class of 
plantation estate masters and their numerous dependents (Scheper-Hughes 1992, 222). 
Historically, civil liberties and human rights have been cast as privileges and favors 
bestowed by the local bosses on subordinates within relations structured by notions of 
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personal honor and loyalty (Scheper-Hughes 1992, 226). The legacy of sugar cane 
plantations, breeding on the one hand the almost omnipotent class of rich landowners, 
and on the other the masses of slaves and poor peasants, and in later days reinforced by 
the power of the coroneis, marks the framework of social relations in the region. The 
remnants of the drought industry are still perceptible today, albeit in a somewhat 
modified form.  
The problem of structural violence was also repeatedly attributed to the unequal access 
to and division of land by my informants. Statements such as the following by Ricardo, 
a young man working for Caritas, abounded when talking with people living in the 
sertão: 
 I think that the root of the inequality and the social problems in this area lies in the 
question of the distribution of land. There is now a lot of debate about limiting the size of 
the properties, but there are a lot of people, with capital, who oppose, even though their 
lands are not productive.[…] There is a lot of violence related to the history of the land… 
(Interview Pesqueira, PE, 06.10.2010). 
 
 Land reform was also seen in the seminars I attended as one of the most essential 
developments on the road to combating both the inequality of the social classes and 
future problems related to climate change. The concentration of both water and the most 
fertile lands in the hands of large estate owners underutilizing the land, or national and 
multinational companies, is giving rise to worry concerning food security and the 
viability of familiar agriculture, which to this day remains the ultimate source of 
subsistence for many people in the sertão. With future projections of the diminishment 
of arable land through desertification and unsustainable land use, and the decrease in 
water for production, the question of viable modes of agriculture in decades to come 
was brought up in both seminars as the number one issue that could prevent large-scale 
migration and famines.  
When discussing the theme of land distribution with my informants, the question of 
agribusiness rose repeatedly as the ‘new threat’ to both sustainable land use and food 
security. Both national and multinational companies have been buying large plots of 
fertile land from both large estate owners and the state. What is interesting to note, is 
that there seems to be a continuum in this legacy of inequality regarding land rights, 
going back centuries to colonial times when land was handed out to aristocrats and 
prominent families for free. These lands first became large fazendas, then were 
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transferred down to the coroneis, and are nowadays mainly in the hands of the sons of 
these coroneis, many of them prominent businessmen or politicians, who are either 
underutilizing the lands or selling them to agribusiness companies. Thus, the framework 
has remained almost unchanged since the times of colonization, with new players 
entering the picture but sustaining the structure all the same.  
The main worry regarding the rise of agribusiness is not only the concentration of land 
in the hands of these megabusinesses, but also their use of agrotoxins in farming and the 
health effects this might have, and the tendency towards monoculture which 
impoverishes the soil further. As the CPT representatives in Cajazeiras noted, the 
relation that these firms have with the land is not a sustainable one, and while the 
benefits reaped at the moment may be huge, this exploitative outlook may in a few 
decades lead to these lands becoming infertile wastelands. As Rafael from Pedra notes: 
“Unlike the city-people, we know and understand nature… we have learnt from it, for 
generations. And finally we get to use that knowledge, and sustain nature at the same 
time. But, God willing, we are still here, fighting” (Interview Pedra, PE 07.10.2010). 
There being no huge advances in the land reform debate as of yet, the access of small 
farmers to land and water may indeed become a severe problem in the future.  
Another instance of old structures repeating themselves through new forms are the large 
infrastructure projects advanced by the government, earlier in the undertakings of the 
SUDENE and later with the San Francisco River transposition project. These were seen 
by many of my informants as nothing but a continuation of the drought industry. The 
large scale development schemes have as of yet not alleviated the problem of droughts 
in the area, but have caused displacements and environmental hazards, also mainly 
benefiting large estates or the agribusiness sector. As seen earlier, many people were of 
the opinion that these projects are nothing but a campaign to win political support and 
visibility. The large majority of small farmers and peasants have been marginalized 
from the river transposition project, gaining no benefit from it, and the critique directed 
towards it is going largely unheard.  
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4.1.2 Imagery and popular culture 
 
One of the biggest factors at the root of the problem, as mentioned earlier, is the 
imagery related to drought, the miséria da seca. Although slowly changing in the 
hinterlands thanks to the efforts of social movements and various organizations, this 
imagery of the sertão is still very much alive, especially among city folk. Paula, a 
cleaner originally from Recife, described her impression of what life is like in the 
sertão:   
Oh those poor things, they have everything going against them, it is too hot to live there, 
the plants die, they are always hungry and always having to move. It is really a shame 
because they are hard-working people, the sertanejos, but life is simply too hard there. 
(Interview Recife, PE, 20.09.2010). 
 
Father Alexandre from Caritas, stationed in Recife, also tried to warn me of what I 
would face on the field:  
You are going to see a lot of misery… Things are changing but the change is happening 
slowly and some people do not want it, so our job is not easy. You will find that it is 
completely different there to what you are used to, people live in mud huts, they have not 
got enough to eat always. But they are good Christians, always kind and welcoming, even 
towards those who use them… (Interview Recife, PE, 31.08.2010). 
 
Although very poetic, the imagery has helped create and reinforce two myths. First of 
all, that the misery and poverty in the region results from a hostile environment, where 
the peasants and farmers become victims of what is often seen as a godly punishment. 
Second, that due to this image, any help or efforts at alleviating the situation on behalf 
of the government or local bosses have come to be seen as benevolent favors, that one 
must also pay back by supporting political agendas. Reflected in the cordeis and the 
testimonies of some of the people I interviewed, this image of the sertanejo tied to his 
land but at the mercy of others is at the background of institutions such as the drought 
industry, and has also for a long time impeded protest and critique of the prevailing 
social structure. As Galtung might say, the historical image of the sertanejo would 
appear to reflect certain outcomes of structural violence; there has indeed been a certain 
feeling of hopelessness and acceptance of the deprivation related to droughts among the 
peasants, that has endured over generations and been reinforced by the local bosses’ 
actions leading to, among other things, the alienation of the masses from political 
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decision making. Once again, the frustration of the peasants is reflected in cordeis as 
well: 
Promessas mirabolantes  Tacky promises 
Falsas tapinhas nas costas  False tappings on the back 
Indecorosas propostas  Improper proposals 
Pra conquistar os votantes  To win over the voters 
Vindos de terras distantes  Coming from faraway lands 
Ou mesmo da região  Or even from this region 
Políticos de ocasião  Opportunist politicians 
Piratas da consciência  Pirates of the conscience 
Nunca tiveram decência  They never had the decency 
Pra trabalhar pro sertão  To work for the sertão 
-Abdias Campos: “A chegada do Velho Chico ao sertão”. 
 
The role of popular local imagery and people’s perceptions of themselves and others 
reflected in the arts is not to be undermined, as I have noted before. I argue that this is 
precisely the channel through which structural violence is ‘normalized’, and repeated 
through generations by the oppressed themselves. By incorporating the imagery into 
their self-perception, they also unintentionally naturalize it, and although in many ways 
may protest against it and find the oppressive structures unacceptable, on a symbolic 
level partake in its reinforcement. This is what the social movements have also paid 
attention to, and which has resulted in active campaigning to change this pessimistic 
image of misery and replace it with a more positive one. 
 
4.2 Climate change and risk society: How to deal with ‘invisible’ threats 
 
There appears to be a consensus, agreed on by the IPCC, experts on the field, and local 
laymen regarding climate change: it is happening, and is foreseen by all to have both 
natural and social consequences. In the future, the well-being of a large number of the 
population of the sertão may be in jeopardy due to diminishing agricultural yields, 
threats to health, and meager access to water, to name a few. Silvana’s statement 
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reflects the general worry expressed by many of my informants regarding the future, as 
has been seen in previous chapters: “I am very worried about the future, because it is 
becoming worse, right? Because all the time the sun is becoming hotter and hotter. And 
this tendency will continue, they say. It will be frightening.” (Interview Venturosa, PE, 
07.10.2010). The fact that these concerns are also global in character adds an interesting 
twist to the problematic, as for the first time the peasants and farmers of the Brazilian 
sertão form part of a world-wide community combating a common evil. I will return to 
the links between the climate change discourse and social movements later on in this 
chapter, focusing first on how the worry about climate change has risen so prominently 
to the foreground.  
 
4.2.1 Cultural meanings of risk 
 
In his theory of risk society, Ulrich Beck points to a change in the cultural meanings of 
risk that also brings about transformations in the social positions of different groups. 
Climate change obviously represents a ‘new’ risk, and one arising from modernization 
itself. In the case of the sertão, it is interesting to note how this novel risk of climate 
change has so naturally been incorporated to the framework of risks that has existed for 
centuries: droughts, famines, misery, and the question of migration. The critique 
directed against agrotoxin use by large companies also says a great deal about the idea 
of reflexive modernization: the health risks arising from the use of these toxins are 
ultimately threats posed by the advancement of knowledge, as it is scientific knowledge 
that is ultimately responsible for the development of these chemicals. The lack of 
spatiality or temporality of the new risks in question also undermines the social class 
system, as everyone is, to some extent, exposed to the danger. Despite this, following 
Beck’s supposition, it would appear that wealth accumulates at the top, risks at the 
bottom of the new dynamic in place. At the moment at least, agribusiness companies are 
reaping huge benefits, whereas the risks regarding unsustainable land use and the 
tendency of desertification will ultimately affect the small farmers most in the long run.  
There is a large selection of potential risks, from which for a number of reasons climate 
change has risen to the foreground. Following Douglas’ and Wildavsky’s theory that 
risks are always socially defined, it can be argued that it is not only the severity of the 
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threat but also institutional factors that affect the amount of attention given to a risk. 
The three institutional types – market, hierarchy, and sect, all have a theory on what 
risks should be paid most attention to and how. In the case of climate change, it can be 
seen that it is the civil society and social movements that are most outspoken about the 
situation in the sertão, and try most fervently to come up with alternative solutions. It is 
the market and hierarchy, that is, the agribusiness companies and central political power 
that strive mostly for large infrastructural undertakings, without notable social change. 
That nature is not just for contemplation has been established earlier – it is also a 
battlefield of internal tensions and social critique. I believe that one of the reasons 
climate change has been chosen as a point of attention is the fact that it can be easily 
linked with other social struggles in the region as well. The fact that the risk posed by 
climate change is also an involuntary one, that is, not a risk consciously chosen by 
anyone, leads to judgments about accountability and mitigation of the effects. This 
brings the moral dimension to the discourse, which I will return to further on.  
The question of accountability in the postmodern risk society is a complicated one. 
Beck argues that the institutions in place are no longer relevant and adequate to deal 
with control and decision-making. The rising ‘new’ powers, economic and scientific 
circles, would according to him replace the state as the key players in the globalizing 
world. In the case of undertakings such as the San Francisco River transposition, it 
seems that the centralized formal political system has allied itself with private economic 
interests, leaving the civil society to search for alternative solutions to combat the 
effects that droughts might have in the future. It may be argued that there has indeed 
been a realignment of both economic and ‘resistance’ camps. In the economic sphere 
the state and industry have paired up, whereas in the search for alternative development 
indigenous groups, environmentalists, and even the church have found each other. An 
example of this is the creation of umbrella organizations such as the ASA that unites 
evangelic and catholic church groups, environmental and development-centered NGOs, 
rural workers’ associations, communitarian organizations and syndicates. (ASA 2010, 
3).   
Following Beck’s theory, it does indeed seem that from the players involved, industry, 
or in this case agribusiness, has benefited the most: the formal political system is still 
seen as the one who should be held accountable and be responsible for regulation, the 
civil society has no real decision-making power, and the innovations introduced by 
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science, such as agrotoxins, genetically manipulated seeds, and novel irrigation systems, 
are eagerly taken to use by the companies. The problem of accountability is especially 
pronounced if one looks at the relation between legislation and reinforcement of laws: 
the country has a rather developed body of laws regulating environmental affairs, but 
due to lack of vigilance and reinforcement, in practice the private sector can operate 
quite freely and even ignore many of the regulations. The problem, on a more global 
scale as well, is that international environmental obligations arise from a body of ‘soft 
law’, that is legally non-binding conference resolutions, declarations and action plans. 
Another, more local challenge in the case of Northeast Brazil regarding environmental 
legislation is that people are not familiar with it, due to lack of information and 
education. (Campos 2009, 87). Thus, while international and regional environmental 
agreements do have the potential to limit state sovereign power and legislation, they are 
constantly torn between transboundary ecological goals and the state territorial 
boundaries of authority. (Mason 2001, 410-411). As it is the state that is ultimately 
responsible for law enforcement, no amount of legal regulations guarantees actual 
control of the situation. 
Thus, Beck’s idea of generalized non-responsibility seems to hold true in the case of 
Northeast Brazil quite well. The issue at hand, climate change, also by nature is one 
where it is practically impossible to lay blame or look for responsible ones, due to the 
problem’s global character. Additionally, I would argue that in the case of Northeast 
Brazil, the historical lack of interest in the region’s development on behalf of the central 
government has created a situation where for a long time the locals have ceased to 
expect much from the formal political system. The general opinion towards politics and 
politicians was one of disdain, and in the question of accountability and the state’s 
obligations the attitude people have is mostly one of resignation. More than once I was 
told that “Brazil works like this”, “it has always been this way”, and although many 
agreed that it should indeed be the formal political system that should guarantee a 
certain level of well-being for the citizens, this would never happen.  
This traditional limbo between not expecting anything from the state and also not 
actively fighting for their rights is, however, gradually changing with the climate 
change discourse. Before this discourse became popular, it could be said that there 
existed among the peasants something akin to what Beck refers to as the “death-reflex 
of normality”, at least based on testimonies and the image portrayed through popular 
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culture. Although the problem of droughts was never denied, it was accepted as part of 
nature and life carried on despite of it. This does not mean, however, that there was no 
form of resistance whatsoever on the part of the peasants; I will return to this point in 
the next subchapter. It also does not mean that in the postmodern era of a global risk 
society the only changes would have been in the roles of the state, market and the civil 
society. I would argue that one of the biggest changes have been in the sphere of the 
popular imagery and culture concerning the sertão, reflected among other things in 
songs, cordel poetry, and the image locals have of themselves and their surroundings. 
New forms of resistance have risen to complement the former everyday ‘weapons of the 
weak’, that will be discussed shortly.  
 
4.2.2 Power of knowledge 
 
The role of knowledge remains a crucial issue when discussing climate change. Even if 
the phenomenon can to some extent be perceived by the senses, scientific knowledge is 
still the ultimate and accepted judge of what is happening now, and what will happen in 
the future. Thus, it is to a large extent scientific knowledge that defines the risk, and 
offers solutions based on these evaluations of the situation. Therefore, as Beck argues, 
in the risk society, science becomes the principal institution for defining and analyzing 
risks, and ultimately through these roles also legitimizes the measures taken to combat 
them. This is especially true in the case of climate change, as its definition rests solidly 
on scientific knowledge. It is precisely an invisible threat that has begun to be ‘felt’ only 
after experts have informed us of what is happening. The scientific foundation of the 
climate change discourse is especially evident in material for contextualized education 
in the sertão, through which NGOs attempt to build awareness among the communities 
for fighting the impacts of climate change. In one educational pamphlet, used in 
workshops among the small farmers’ communities, climate change was explained as 
follows: 
There are many signs that the Earth is going through a big change: floods, droughts, 
winds, hurricanes, tsunamis, melting of glaciers in the sea and in the mountains, sea level 
rise, and higher temperatures that are unbearable. We know this because many educated 
people around the world have joined their knowledge in order to understand what is 
happening. Most of the work was done by the UN, in the Intergovernmental Panel on 
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Climate Change. The studies, done with much care and responsibility, concluded that life 
on Earth is seriously threatened. (CNBB 2009, 9). 
Thus, it is interesting to note is how this expert knowledge has become a part of layman 
discourse as well, reflected in the local perceptions. For example, the following excerpts 
from interviews conducted on the field show that there is an overlap between the 
beginning of ASA’s awareness building campaigns in the sertão, and the time when the 
locals claim to have first started noticing the effects of climate change. The ASA was 
formed in 1999, and started concrete action on the field in different locations in the 
early 2000s. (Interview Pesqueira, PE, 06.10.2010). 
Silvana, from Venturosa: 
The climate has changed completely, absolutely completely! It is a lot hotter, the 
temperatures are rising each year, the rains are irregular, it is this global warming. We are 
noticing the difference, it is clear. In the last 6-8 years we have started noticing these 
changes. (Interview Venturosa, PE, 07.10.2010). 
Isabel, working for Caritas Brazil in Pesqueira: 
R: Have you noticed some changes in the climate, weather alterations for example? 
I: Yes, yes, we... actually we have been noticing that annually, the thing is, if we looked 
at the years 2004 to 2010, we notice a huge variation. What does that mean? The rains are 
each year more and more irregular, right? It is supposed to rain 5 months and it only rains 
1 or 2, the rainy seasons are unpredictable, there is a very big change going on, right? 
And the thing is, this is what we have been reflecting upon in the communities, what 
these changes mean, and they are one reason for why we are constructing, as well. What 
is our reaction and action regarding all that, right, preservation, and this in the semiarid is 
an important thing mainly for rural communities, because land use is quite…complicated 
really. The farmers, many of them, have this culture of slash-and-burn agriculture, of 
leaving their plots completely stripped, right, of using a lot of agrotoxins. We know that 
all these things contribute to the process called desertification, right? And the thing is, 
here, in the municipalities where we work, there are some that already start to show 
alarming indexes of desertification, it is advancing rapidly. (Interview Pesqueira, PE, 
05.10.2010). 
 
Desertification, although foreseen to have serious impacts on the environment in the 
future, is still at the moment concentrated on very specific locations, and not yet very 
widespread. Despite this, it is clear that contextualized education, in other words 
simplified information deriving from international official reports such as those by the 
IPCC concerning climate change, has done its share in establishing the threat of 
desertification in the local’s minds, as can be seen from the statement by Alberto from 
Petrolina: 
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R: So, what do you think the climate will be like in 20 or 25 years from now? 
A: Worse. Everything will be worse regarding the climate in the Northeast. First of all, 
with desertification, with the extension of the sandbanks on the rivers, this tendency of 
desertification will only grow. The climate will become more and more irregular with the 
diminishment of waterways and forests. And desertification will in its turn raise the 
temperatures higher. (Interview Recife, PE, 12.08.2010). 
 
Thus, in a very short period of time, the idea of global climate change, or what scientists 
have termed the “fingerprint” of the greenhouse effect, “has become firmly rooted in 
our world-view, a permanent component of the stories we tell each other about the 
interplay between natural and social laws that affects our everyday life and our picture 
of its future” (Ross 1991, 6). Although trends such as desertification, irregular rainfall 
and the rise in temperature are also felt by the farmers, the vocabulary they use to 
describe these phenomena is to a large extent borrowed from experts. As the cordel 
poetry quoted in various chapters of this study shows, new issues are finding their way 
into different forms of traditional popular culture, but the way they are portrayed is 
changing. Topics such as climate change, the San Francisco River transposition, etc. are 
taken up in the cordeis, but the language is less lyrical and more scientific than 
depictions of droughts and migrations from earlier times. I would argue that through 
this new discourse, a big part of the traditional popular imagery is changing altogether, 
as those who have formerly seen themselves as victims of a hostile environment harness 
scientific knowledge both to explain and combat the harms coming their way.   
The importance of knowledge lies also in its power to integrate the sertanejos to the 
global climate change discourse. As Ross notes, the difference between the language of 
scientific expertise and the popular culture of experience is not a difference in kind, but 
is rather ranked on the scale of power, and “reflects real inequalities not only in the 
degree of power that different cultural groups have over their relation to the physical 
world, but also in each group’s ability to make arguments that will affect that relation” 
(Ross 1991, 23-24). As shall be seen further on, the climate change discourse has given 
the peasants and farmers a new weapon to fight social inequality as well, and question 
age-old structures such as land distribution through a new perspective. The fact that 
climate change affects not only the poor but everyone to some extent legitimizes new 
arguments, and the social movements and NGOs have made contextualized education 
and awareness building an essential point in their actions on the field. Seminars and 
workshops abound both explaining climate change to the locals, and familiarizing them 
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with concrete techniques such as cistern building and use. Education was also 
mentioned by many as the number one factor in mitigating the effects of climate change 
in the future, as through it generations to come are hoped to have a lifestyle more 
favorable to sustainable development.  
 
4.3   Resistance through green consciousness and agro-ecology 
 
Tudo isso acabou, tudo isso acabou,  That all ended, that all ended, 
 tudo isso acabou, quando a ASA chegou that all ended when the ASA came 
Quero falar do menino,   I want to tell you of the kid, 
 que ‘tava com barriga,   who had his tummy bad, 
 que com a canela fina nao comia nada nao, didn´t eat anything 
 era um problema danada,   It was a real problem, 
era grande a confusao, mas tudo isso acabou, the fight was hard,  
tudo isso acabou, tudo isso acabou,   but that all ended, that all ended, 
quando a ASA chegou… that all ended, when the ASA 
came… 
 
The above are the lyrics of a song sung to me by Dona Aurelia, whose story is a good 
example of the empowerment and regaining of hope and self-esteem that the actions of 
NGOs and social movements have achieved in some cases in the region. Dona Aurelia 
has lived in the municipality of Aguas Belas in the state of Pernambuco all her life, and 
is well-known for her home-made herbal medicines, a trade passed on to her by her 
mother. She and her husband own a small farm, and have since childhood had a special 
relation to the land, reinforced through the knowledge of the curative properties the 
plants have to offer. But years ago Dona Aurelia fell into depression, and during 8 years 
she did could not bring herself to gather or look after the plants or the small farm. The 
yields were often destroyed by the droughts and the water they had for use was 
contaminated, further lowering Dona Aurelia’s spirits.  Then, in 2009, the family 
became a beneficiary of ASA’s cistern program, with the help of which they received a 
cistern on their property. This animated Dona Aurelia once again to start planting 
medicinal herbs, and to start passing her knowledge on to others as well. She also 
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started, through song and poetry, analyzing her depression and noted soon that she was 
not only getting better but becoming once again solicited for the cures, benefiting the 
entire community. She explained that seeing how a simple solution, gathering rainwater 
“straight from the skies”, restored her faith in the land and in the abilities that nature has 
to cure from illness. Noticing little by little that she also had an important role in the 
community, and possessed a skill that could well go forgotten did she not pass it on, 
also further restored her self-worth. (Interview Aguas Belas, PE, 06.10.2010). 
 
 
4.3.1 Reviving the civil society: The role of NGOs in resistance 
  
 
Discussing climate change with my informants invariably lead to talk about water 
scarcity and agriculture, and one of the main worries repeated by the majority was food 
security in the future. For a region with an unfortunate history of famines, guaranteeing 
food production is no minor detail: it is a question of life and death. As I explained 
previously, early on in the discussions I had with people the themes of a rising green 
consciousness and agro-ecological farming rose up, which was the main reason I 
decided to take up the offer presented by the NGO Caritas to visit the projects they were 
involved in, with the ASA in various localities in the sertão in the states of Pernambuco 
and Paraíba. The ASA is a network made up of approximately 750 organizations from 
the civil society, which partake in the management and development of policies in the 
semi-arid region. Its goal is to strengthen the actions of the civil society to promote 
sustainable growth by focusing on agro-ecology, on food and nutritional security, on 
contextualized education, on the struggle against desertification, on the access to land 
and to water and on the promotion of gender equality. (ASA 2010, 3). The projects I 
visited were called Programa Um Milhão de Cisternas (“One Million Cisterns- 
Program”) and Programa Uma Terra e Duas Águas (“One Land, Two Waters- 
Program”). The former program focuses on supplying clean water for drinking, whereas 
the latter aims at guaranteeing food production. Thus, “one land”, referring to land for 
production, and “two waters”, referring to the two types of water: drinking water and 
water for the production of food. (ASA 2010, 12-17).  
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In recent decades there has been a huge growth in the number of NGOs and other civil 
society initiatives dealing both with water and food security questions, land rights 
issues, environmental justice, indigenous rights etc. Internationally, probably the most 
well-known of these movements is the MST, The Landless Peasants’ Movement, 
representatives of which I did not have a chance to interview, unfortunately. According 
to several of my informants, this surge in civil society action has grown especially 
during the presidency of Luíz Inácio Lula da Silva, who, being from a farmer family 
from the state of Pernambuco himself, has given renewed faith in the eyes of the 
nordestinos to the region’s development. As Gustavo states: “We are lucky, here in the 
Northeast, to have a farmer, from this area, as the president of the country. Lula has 
made huge changes, there has been a huge surge in social movements, since he came to 
power there have been enormous advances.” (Interview Arcoverde, PE, 06.10.2010). 
The main endeavor of ASA and other organizations is precisely to find alternative, 
grass-roots solutions to not only promote sustainable development, but also to empower 
the peasants and promote political independence from the local bosses.  
The relationship between civil society organizations such as the ASA, NGOs and 
church-affiliated groups and their direct beneficiaries is somewhat complicated. Often it 
is the organizations that choose the beneficiaries first, but the approach is not entirely a 
top-down one based on charity, as the beneficiaries tend to become activists for the 
cause themselves. NGOs often give a spark to social movements, and are the initial 
institutional vehicles that articulate social protest and collective action. (Fisher 1997, 
451). Gustavo pointed this out by asking:  
Who is developing Brazil nowadays? – The voluntaries, the social movements. We are 
doing most of the work. The Northeast is not all about misery, this image that people 
have, even on the coast, is no longer true. Yes, in the past there was a lot of suffering, but 
that was during the time of the SUDENE, the carros pipas, all that… We may not have a 
lot, but we get by. Everything changed with ASA, with the government of Lula, with 
people themselves doing something… the Northeast has changed, really. (Interview 
Arcoverde, PE, 06.10.2010). 
And to some extent, what ‘the people are doing’ seems to be working; Caio, working 
for Caritas in Pesqueira, explained that there are families who migrated in the past from 
the region, who are returning to their original homes thanks to the programs and a 
revived hope in life in the Northeast. (Interview Pesqueira, PE, 06.10.2010). What was 
felt to be needed in the future by Mariana, working for Caritas in Cajazeiras, Paraíba, 
was increased awareness building: “people still do not understand the importance of 
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agro-ecological farming… it is the simple things that will improve our health, our 
lives…and strengthen familiar agriculture.” (Interview Cajazeiras, PB, 12.10.2010). 
 
4.3.2 Changing forms of everyday resistance 
 
There has been an interesting development in forms of everyday resistance used by the 
peasants in the region, some of which remind the ones described by Scott discussed in 
the previous chapter, and some that are more tied to the climate change discourse itself. 
The traditional covert forms of resistance in the sertão include squatting on lands owned 
by others, tapping into the San Francisco transposition canals, and what in Brazil is 
known as jeitinho. The jeitinho is a way to grease the wheels of government or the 
bureaucracy in order to obtain favors, or to bypass rules or regulations. Jeitinhos are 
neither exactly legitimate favors, nor clear corruption, but can be considered extra-legal 
deeds. (Greenfield in Levine et al 1999, 403). For example the political loyalty in 
elections related to the drought industry is one instance of jeitinho, especially in cases 
where a farmer or a peasant does not have the financial means to ‘tip’ an official or 
politician in order to obtain a favor. What is common to all the above forms of everyday 
resistance is, following Scott’s theory, precisely the fact that they do not threaten the 
established social order, and although may not reflect an acceptance of this order, does 
imply a compliance with it. There is also a moral component to them, through which the 
legally doubtful means of resistance gain legitimacy in the eyes of the peasants: like 
Robin Hood stealing from the rich to the poor, they feel entitled to these covert forms of 
“taking their own” as victims of a social system that does not care for them, and a cold 
capitalist logic where the bigger players, be they agribusiness companies or local 
politicians and landowners, can overrun them.  
Scott’s conceptualization of the weapons of the weak thus includes certain 
characteristics that can be found in both the old and new forms of peasant resistance in 
the sertão. The protest is covert, subtle, and incorporates the moral and symbolic 
realms. Precisely by challenging symbolic constructs such as the mito da seca, drought 
myth, and replacing these with more optimistic images of the hinterlands, the locals are 
appropriating symbols and relabeling the present. In highlighting the caring and close 
relationship they have to the land, the peasants and small farmers are also legitimizing 
their demands on both a moral and a historical foundation. Linking these demands to a 
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global protest against cold capitalist logic and unsustainable environmental practices 
also give their arguments additional strength. The new element of resistance among the 
poor is the climate change discourse, as I have noted earlier on. The strength of this 
discourse lies above all in the moral realm connected to and in the scientific ‘facts’ 
supporting it. First of all, in international human rights parlance environmental rights 
have come to be seen in the last decades as a basic human right. Through the threat of 
climate change, there has also formed a global community defending green values and 
opposing rampant capitalist logic, into which the sertanejos have also incorporated 
themselves.  The stressing of a unique and sustainable relationship with the land that the 
peasants have, the search for grass-roots level alternative solutions in farming 
techniques and irrigation, and the critique toward agrotoxin use are all instances of this 
moral discourse. 
 Through the concern about the planet’s future, the sertanejos have also gained a 
weapon to question social inequalities. Following Brosius, I argue that in the case of the 
sertão, environmental debates are incorporated to broader struggles for democratization 
and rights. The traditional structures of domination, such as land distribution, are thus 
being challenged using the language of environmentalism. (Brosius 1999, 287).  The 
appropriation of scientific language by the peasants, and the change from ‘combating’ 
droughts to ‘living with them’ (combate vs. convivência) reflects the change in imagery 
and local culture, where a hostile environment is being blamed less and more emphasis 
is put on the social structure. This change in paradigm also shows in a new feeling of 
empowerment by those participating in the social movements demanding environmental 
rights, where former ‘victims’ are becoming active participants in voicing out concerns 
related to climate change. I would argue that there is a transformation going on in this 
symbolic realm of knowledge production and imagery, where the historical image of the 
sertão is gradually being replaced by a more positive and optimistic view by the 
peasants and farmers themselves.  
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5 CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this study, I have approached the problem of poverty in the hinterlands of Northeast 
Brazil through the concept of structural violence, linking the environmental threats 
posed by climate change, especially those related to droughts, to the broader social 
struggles in the region. I have focused on both layman and expert perceptions on 
climate change, and questioned the assumptions about its effects in the future, mainly 
that of increased numbers of ‘climate refugees’ or people forced to migrate due to 
changes in climate. The focus on droughts, as opposed to other manifestations of 
climate change, arose from the fact that droughts are not only phenomena that develop 
over a longer time span than floods or hurricanes, for example, but also due to the 
historical persistence of droughts in the region, and both the institutional and cultural 
linkages that have evolved around it. The instances of structural violence that I chose to 
highlight in this study are the drought industry, land use, and the social and power 
relations present in the region, including those between the civil society, the state and 
the private agribusiness sector. These all work against a backdrop of symbolic and 
moral realms of value production, where relations between the different actors are being 
negotiated anew with the rise of the climate change discourse.  
The choice to use structural violence as the initial theoretical framework through which 
I have approached poverty was inspired by the fact that it takes more into account the 
power relations underlying poverty than theories dealing with the issue purely as 
material needs deprivation. When discussions about potentials and rights are 
incorporated into the problematic of poverty, a deeper insight is obtained regarding the 
various factors behind the phenomenon. It is generally believed that climate change is 
affecting the already marginalized and poor more than the wealthy or those of higher 
social standing, and will increasingly do so in the future. Thus, I find it fruitful to 
discover the links between environmental concerns and poverty, as the risk of climate 
change has in recent decades become one of the most discussed threats faced by the 
entire global community, a large majority of which lives in poverty. Also, the persistent 
poverty and ’backwardness’ of the region hint that there are long-standing institutions in 
place which reiterate the problem on an intergenerational scale, and cultural 
understandings, reflected, as I have shown, in popular art forms as well, naturalizing the 
situation. Differing from Farmer, I however argue that it is not the neoliberal economic 
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regime that is the culprit as such, but the structural model originating already from times 
of colonization; the structure remains, but different players and ideas fill the slots in 
different historical periods. We should also not underestimate the power of the symbolic 
domain of ‘myths’, such as mito da seca, that has justified certain oppressive 
institutions such as the drought industry to remain in place for so long. All in all, I feel 
that the theory of structural violence is apt to explain the roots of the problem, and 
inquiring into these roots sheds light on the different aspects of the present situation. 
However, its focus on the state’s role, its rather abstract character and its dismissal of 
the ‘victims’ own involvement in the reiteration of the structures, and in their resistance 
of them, makes it insufficient to explain the whole picture.  
To make the theoretical framework more temporally tied to the postmodern era of 
globalization and transnational threats, I find the ideas of Beck and others regarding risk 
society very useful. In the era of global ecological hazards, power-relations are being 
redefined and new actors including the scientific community, the civil society and 
multinational companies are gaining more and more ground in relation to the nation-
state. The shift from wealth-distribution to risk-distribution also marks an important 
transformation in relations between different social groups. One of the most important 
features of the contemporary times is the increased role of knowledge, as has been seen 
earlier on. The social definition of risks and contests about which risks are focused on 
and who defines them, is a good example of how knowledge relates to power. Scientific 
knowledge has become an instrument of power, seeked by both experts and laymen 
alike. In the case of climate change discourse, knowledge not only justifies critique, but 
also legitimates action: green consciousness has been the foundation for social critique 
among the peasants and small farmers in the sertão of Northeast Brazil, and has also 
given additional impetus to question and begin transforming age-old popular imagery. 
Also, the fact that the climate change discourse has a global character links local 
communities and their struggles to a global alliance of critique. New alliances have also 
formed locally, on the field, as I have shown: on the one hand, church groups, peasants 
and environmental movements have found common ground; on the other hand, private 
agribusiness companies and the state drive for large-scale technological undertakings 
benefiting both.  
What seems to have changed with the arrival of the climate change discourse in the 
hinterlands of Northeast Brazil is a new sort of positive resistance by the peasants and 
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social movements, based on moral arguments about the importance of environmentally 
sustainable farming, paying attention to health risks originating from the use of 
agrotoxins, and return to solidarity.  All these are exemplified in the trend towards agro-
ecological farming discussed earlier, where all the aforementioned elements are 
combined to form an alternative solution to agribusiness that is both environmentally 
friendly, organic, and boosts traditional cultural values through an emphasis on family 
farms. Scientific ‘facts’, and contextualized education have been key factors in this new 
trend, and have largely been appropriated by the communities as arguments through 
which they question other social concerns as well. Linking the theory of peasant 
resistance advocated by Scott to the idea of structural violence in the era of risk society 
therefore adds the missing component to the picture: the action of the people involved. 
It is not only abstract structures and global trends such as globalization or economic 
regimes that direct the course of people’s lives: they do actively participate in this 
process themselves as well. As I have mentioned, forms of resistance similar to those 
described by Scott, everyday, covert “weapons of the weak”, have existed in the region 
for a long time. These have included squatting on lands owned by someone else, 
tapping into the San Francisco River transposition canals already in place, and the 
jeitinho. What is common to these forms of resistance, although also backed by moral 
conceptions of what is ‘right’ is that they do not defy the prevalent social structure as 
such.  
However, the climate change discourse, albeit not resulting in open defiance in most 
cases, questions the underlying historical institutions as well, including land distribution 
and the power of the politicos- all this in the name of ‘common good’. The forms of 
resistance emerging in the case of the hinterlands of Northeast Brazil thus also lead to 
questioning the suppositions put worth by scientists and the media concerning the future 
social effects of climate change. As I noted in the introduction, the general consensus 
seems to hold that we are to prepare for huge migratory movements of ‘climate 
refugees’, whereas the data I gathered on the field would, at least in the region in 
question, point to the opposite trend. Even with the difficulties posed by climate change 
to agriculture, it seems that rural-to-urban migration has on the whole diminished, not 
increased, and when prevalent is happening for entirely different reasons. Whereas in 
the past the droughts did indeed drive the ‘afflicted’ to the cities in search of a meager 
subsistence, as we have seen by testimonies and numerous fiction and non-fiction 
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descriptions of this era, nowadays it is mainly education and urban work opportunities 
that attract especially the younger generations from the countryside to the city. The idea 
of adapting to, or ‘living with’ (convivência) the semi-arid advocated by the social 
movements, NGOs and to an increasing degree public authorities has fortified faith in 
staying on the land, and simple technological innovations such as the cisterns are also 
making it more viable an alternative these days, even with the challenges posed by 
climate change. The global estimates about a rise in the number of mass migrations due 
to climate change may obviously become a reality in some regions, but these grand 
projections fail to take into consideration the innovative solutions people find to 
problems facing them, and the ways that culture and action is capable of adapting to a 
changing environment. This is not to say, obviously, that climate change does not imply 
challenges and concerns for those living in the semi-arid region of Northeast Brazil. As 
we have seen, the access to land is still a huge problem, and although the arrival of 
cisterns, agro-ecological farming and other innovations does facilitate staying on the 
farms for those who already have land, the ranks of the landless are ever-growing, also 
due to population growth in the last decades.  
The question of land was also seen by many to be the root cause of other emerging 
social problems: with the arrival of foreign and national agribusiness companies, there 
has been a parallel trend of industrialization in the rural centers of the semi-arid region. 
This industrialization has also led to a ‘semi-urbanization’ of these centers, small towns 
that are now starting to face urban problems in a rural setting. Many of my informants 
attributed the increase in youth crime, drug abuse, and violence to this trend. Although 
not directly linked to climate change, but more so to the selling of land at cheap prices 
to the agribusiness companies, these tendencies of ‘city-problems’ arrival in the sertão 
were a genuine concern. This shows that not only to ensure survival in the face of 
climate change, but also to curb emerging social problems, it is essential to act on the 
question of unequal land distribution in the future.  
To conclude, in this study I hope to have shown that there are a number of interesting 
interrelations between environmental concerns and both power and social relations. 
These relations in turn unfold against a backdrop of both moral and symbolic realms of 
value production, which influence significantly the production of knowledge and 
imagery. Taking the concept of structural violence and linking it to environmental 
hazards may have seemed far-fetched initially, but I argue that the analytical concept is 
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very useful in the study of poverty to highlight the institutional aspects of the problem, 
and that the theory can and should be used more extensively. Anthropological studies of 
poverty should, I argue, take the links between the natural and social environments 
more into consideration, and increasingly focus on threats such as climate change, that 
can in the future affect the lives of everyone drastically, and in unforeseeable ways. I 
also argue that anthropologists should definitely follow, and reflect upon in their 
studies, the rising trends in society. Climate change has been a topic of popular 
discussion for decades, yet I found surprisingly few Finnish anthropological studies 
dealing with it. Environmental topics on the whole were upsettingly underrepresented in 
anthropological academic studies in Finland, so there is a lot of terrain to cover in this 
field in the future. 
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Appendix 1: List of acronyms  
 
ASA: The Half-Barren Articulation (Articulação no Semi-Árido). 
CEPAL: The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean  (Comisión Económica 
para América Latina y el Caribe). 
CIMI: The Indigenous Missionary Council (Conselho Indigenista Missionario). 
CNBB:  The National Conference of Brazilian Bishops (Conferência Nacional dos Bispos do 
Brasil). 
COEP: Committee of Entities Against Hunger and For Life (Comitê de Entidades no Combate à 
Fome e pela Vida). 
CPT: Pastoral Land Commission (Comissão Pastoral da Terra). 
ENSO: El Niño- Southern Oscillation. 
FIAN: FoodFirst Information and Action Network. 
GCM: General Circulation Model. 
IBGE: Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e 
Estadística). 
IFOCS: Federal Inspectorate of Anti-Drought Works (Inspectoria Federal de Obras Contra as 
Secas).  
IPCC: The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 
MPA: Small Farmers’ Movement (Movimento dos Pequenos Agricultores). 
MST: The Landless Peasants’ Movement (Movimento Sem Terra). 
PAE-PE: The State Action Program against Desertification and Mitigation of the Effects of 
Droughts – Pernambuco (Programa de Ação Estadual – Pernambuco). 
PE: Pernambuco. 
PB: Paraíba. 
PNMC: The National Climate Change Policy (Plano Nacional sobre Mudança do Clima). 
SECTMA: The Secretariat of Technological Sciences and Environment (Secretaria de Ciências de 
Tecnologia e Meio Ambiente). 
SRH: The Secretariat of Hydraulic Resources and Energy (Secretaria de Recursos Hídricos e 
Energéticos). 
FIOCRUZ: Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (Fundación Oswaldo Cruz); research institute attached to the 
Brazilian Ministry of Health. 
UFPE: Federal University of Pernambuco (Universidade Federal de Pernambuco). 
SUDENE: The Superintendency for the Development of the Northeast (Superintendência de 
Desenvolvimento do Nordeste). 
UFCG: The Federal University of Campina Grande (Universidade Federal de Campina Grande). 
UNCCD: United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification. 
 
 
Appendix 2: Map of the sertão 
               
 
                 (Source: Agência Nacional de Águas in ASA 2010,5). 
Appendix 3: Photo of carro pipa (with permission by the CPT, Cajazeiras, PB) and cistern (photo 
taken in Águas Belas, PE.) 
               
 
               
Appendix 4: Painting ”Fugindo da Seca” by J. Miguel, 2007. 
 
 
